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Abstract 
 
Ensuring trustworthiness through mobile nodes is a serious issue. 
Indeed, securing the routing protocols in Mobile Ad Hoc Network 
(MANET) is of paramount importance. A key exchange cryptography 
technique is one such protocol. Trust relationship between mobile nodes 
is essential. Without it, security will be further threatened. The absence 
of infrastructure and a dynamic topology changing reduce the 
performance of security and trust in mobile networks.  
Current proposed security solutions cannot cope with eavesdroppers and 
misbehaving mobile nodes. Practically, designing a key exchange 
cryptography system is very challenging.  Some key exchanges have 
been proposed which cause decrease in power, memory and bandwidth 
and increase in computational processing for each mobile node in the 
network consequently leading to a high overhead. Some of the trust 
models have been investigated to calculate the level of trust based on 
recommendations or reputations. These might be the cause of internal 
malicious attacks.  
Our contribution is to provide trustworthy communications among the 
mobile nodes in the network in order to discourage untrustworthy mobile 
nodes from participating in the network to gain services.        
As a result, we have presented an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange and trust framework mechanism for securing the 
communication between mobile nodes. Since our proposed model uses a 
small key and less calculation, it leads to a reduction in memory and 
bandwidth without compromising on security level. Another advantage 
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of the trust framework model is to detect and eliminate any kind of 
distrust route that contain any malicious node or suspects its behavior.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTROUDCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
It is a fact that new technologies play important roles in our lives. The 
last ten years have seen a speedy growth in the use of wireless mobile 
technologies. We are increasingly using wireless links instead of 
traditional cable in our homes, offices and public places. This increase in 
use of such technologies poses a challenge in terms of security.  Indeed, 
exchange of important information between devices such as PDA, 
mobile phones, laptops and tablets wirelessly is subject to intrusion from 
unidentified and untrusted network participants. This leads to the need 
for special security measures for wireless networks. 
Security solutions are available for infrastructure based wireless 
networks such as (WiMAX) IEEE 802.16 and (WLAN) IEEE 802.11 
[1].  This is not an issue for Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) without 
infrastructure. We therefore have a security challenge that requires a 
secure communication design. 
The definition of MANET is a collection of mobile nodes communicate 
wirelessly and moving dynamically for forming a provisional wireless 
network. This kind of network does not need any kind of infrastructure 
based network. The purpose of each mobile node is to work as a router 
to forward and receive packets from other nodes in the network.  
MANET applications can be used in efficient and dynamic 
communication such as emergency operations, military and remote 
areas. MANET is based on special characteristics which are different 
from traditional infrastructure wireless based; for example, mobility, 
2 
 
bandwidth limitations and variable ability links, energy limitations, and 
physical security limitations. 
The Routing layer is one of the important layers in any MANET 
network. This layer is for all time required discovering the route to 
transmit packets correctly among origin and target mobile nodes.  
Designing a routing protocol in MANET is a major challenge. 
According to [2], routing protocols categorized into three groups:  
Proactive, Reactive and Hybrid protocols. 
The Development of a good security solution is the second step in 
designing routing protocol. It is crucial to know the possible forms of 
attacks. In MANET, broadcasting wireless medium inherently signifies 
that attacks may come from any direction and in different network 
layers.  A  secure routing protocol has to provide these services: 
availability, confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-
repudiation [3].  
 An important kind of security is cryptography. This technique uses 
mathematicl science to encrypt or decrypt the data between two 
communications parties. By using the encryption techniques we can be 
sure that the information is transmitted securely. The technique works in 
the following manner: it encrypts a plain text to cipher text and transmits 
it to the target mobile node to decrypt cipher text to as it is plain text. 
There are three types of cryptography: Symmetric key (Secret key) - 
which uses one key for both encryption and decryption mechanisms; 
Asymmetric key (Public key) - which uses one key for encryption 
mechanism and the other key for decryption mechanism; and hash 
function which uses an arithmetic conversion to encrypt of the 
information. Cryptography can give confidentiality; Hash function can 
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give integrity. In fact, none of these types of security will work without 
trust [4]. Trust model is a kind of mechanism to protect the routes from 
untrustable mobile nodes in the network.  There are three kinds of trust 
models: direct trust, hierarchical trust and web of trust.  
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is defined as a process on the public 
key mechanism that depend on an algebraic formation of the elliptic 
curve over finite fields [5], or with large prime numbers. The main 
advantage of using ECC is using a smaller key size compared to other 
encryption techniques such RSA 
1.2 Research Motivation 
A Mobile ad hoc network works without any infrastructure base. The 
mobile nodes have to work as routes to communicate with each other. 
Routing layer such as DSR, AODV, DSDV “Destination-Sequenced 
Distance-Vector”, OLSE, etc. is the most important for researchers. 
Routing security has to be trustworthy, speedy and secure during 
information exchange between mobile nodes in Mobile Ad Hoc 
Network. Security mechanisms such as Ariadne have been proposed [6, 
7]. Ariadne relies only on TESLA (Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant 
Authentication) which is a kind of symmetric cryptography. TESLA is 
an efficient authentication. However, it needs the receiver to buffer 
packets through one disclosure delay before it can authenticate them. 
Many attacks such as malicious attacks or selfish attacks try to disturb 
the network operations by modifying, dropping, altering, fabricating or 
injecting packets to consume the network resources.  
Securing the channel among the source and the destination mobile nodes 
in the network from misbehaving attacks in an efficient manner is of 
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paramount importance. This project proposes to solve this security issue 
in a way that saves power consumption and memory as well.  
 
1.3 Objectives 
This research aims to improve the integrity, availability, reliability, 
confidentiality, non-repudiation of Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) 
communications and the data in the upcoming future. Moreover, because 
of nodes mobility and changing environment, the proposed mechanisms 
have been designed to be scalable.     
 
1.4 Contribution 
As mentioned above, security is a major concern in routing protocols in 
MANET. Therefore, this kind of network is very vulnerable to attacks 
compared to wired networks. We are aiming to design an overall 
security rule by implementing the security requirements that predict, 
detect and solve the vulnerabilities.  
To achieve the security requirements and targets and defeat any attacks, 
we need to have a set of efficient secure mechanisms. Our research 
shows that cryptography mechanisms are essential security management 
tools.   
Our contribution to the research topic can be split into the following two 
areas: 
1. Our proposal is to exchange keys by using Elliptic Curve Diffie-
hellman (ECDH). This is because ECDH is perfect in flexibility to 
node capture, has excellent scalability, low memory and 
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bandwidth requirements, and low communications overhead. For 
example, an eavesdropper can know part of the key but he/she 
cannot compute the secret key. In addition, these public keys 
remain unchanged over network lifetime and could be used again 
for key exchange with different mobile nodes.  
2. In our trust model stage is to evaluate the experience of the trust 
vector by monitoring the node participation, node forwarding 
packet and node dropping packets. Our scheme helps in achieving 
authentication with minimal overhead.    
 
1.5 Thesis structure  
This thesis consists of 6 chapters. This chapter is a short introduction 
about Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET).  
Chapter 2 presents background information on Mobile Ad Hoc Network 
(MANET), by describing its characteristics, applications, routing 
protocols and security issues. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the area of cryptography and includes a description of 
the different types of cryptography. It also describes the Hash function 
and Key Management. The chapter ends with a brief summary. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on the Elliptic Curve Cryptography in DSR Routing 
Protocol. The first two sections describe the Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography. In the third section, presents and analyzes the Diffie-
Hellman Key Exchange. The fourth section focuses on the Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange.  Then moves on to 
describe the ECDH Experiment in MANET and discuss simulation 
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results on self-created scenarios using performance metrics. Fifth section 
presents the security handshake attacks.  Finally chapter ends with a 
short summary. 
Chapter 5 discusses trust in ad-hoc networks. It analyses trust in routing 
protocols focusing specifically on security aware protocols and trust-
aware routing protocols. It examines trust computation in routing and 
looks at a novel method of message security using trust table multi-path 
routine. The final part of this chapter consists of a short conclusion.  
The last chapter of this thesis consists of a summary of the data 
presented in the first five chapters. The thesis ends with directions for 
further research.  
 
1.6 Publications 
Paper published in PGNet conference 11th Annual Postgraduate 
Symposium on the Convergence of Telecommunications, Networking 
and Broadcasting (2010)  
1. S. Almotiri and I. Awan, Trust Routing in MANET for Securing 
DSR Routing Protocol, PGNet (2010) 
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
This chapter focuses on the Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET). By 
drawing on current research in the field, it aims to provide a concise 
picture of MANETs. In the first section, it describes the characteristics 
and applications of MANETs based on [2, 8-12]. In the next section, it 
discusses the routing protocols of MANET, following Das, Hu, Johnson, 
Macker, Misra, Perkins, Tseng, and Xing 2006. The third part of this 
chapter focuses on the security issues of MANET. This section is largely 
based on papers by [7, 13-26].   And it concludes with a brief summary. 
2.1 Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET)  
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) is defined as a set of mobile nodes 
working wirelessly and dynamically forming a provisional wireless 
network. This kind of wireless network does not rely on any network 
infrastructure unlike traditional mobile wireless network – for example, 
sensor networks, emergency rescue, etc. Node mobility may change the 
network topology frequently at unpredicted times. Without an 
infrastructure, nodes have to cooperate to provide the necessary network 
functionality. Every mobile node in the network has a dual function as 
(a) a host: to send and receive packets among mobile nodes in the 
network and (b) as a router:  to do a route discovery and route 
maintenance. Transmission domain for a mobile node could detect other 
mobile node transmission domain with difficulty, as illustrated in Figure 
2.1 [8]. There are many benefits to the “Mobile Ad Hoc architecture, 
such as self-reconfiguration and adaptability to highly variable mobile 
characteristics such as power and transmission conditions, traffic 
distributions, and load balancing” [27],2009, p.25) . Some of the 
possible ideas proposed to solve problems include “distributed MAC and 
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dynamic routing, wireless service location protocol, wireless dynamic 
host configuration protocol, distributed admission call control, and 
quality-of-service (QoS)” [27] (2009, p.25), based on routing 
mechanisms [12]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) 
 
2.1.1 MANET Applications 
Some MANET examples are used in emergency or disaster operations, 
military networks and remote area. In a particular situation of any 
mobile ad hoc network applications cannot be based on central well-
organized communication. Another application of MANET is to conduct 
field studies in remote locations. Lately, many researchers have been 
including the use of MANET applications in their vehicles to make it 
efficiently available with the vehicular environment. For example, 
Mobile Node 
Mobile Node 
Mobile Node 
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distributing recent traffic information to all vehicles including traffic 
accidents [18]. 
2.1.2 Characteristics and challenges of MANET 
There are two categories of wireless networks: (a) infrastructure 
networks and (b) wireless ad hoc networks. Entire wireless network 
infrastructure works with the variety of networks supporting tools such 
as a base station and wireless access points. Wireless ad hoc networks 
are therefore different from wireless infrastructure based networks. 
According to [2], these networks have several important characteristics:. 
The paragraphs below, based on [2] (1999, p.3-4), further explain these 
characteristics: 
1. Dynamic topology (Mobility): Mobile nodes are ultimate to move 
around expeditiously. Consequently, the topology of a network, 
that classically multi hops, can be modified many times at random 
and rapidly, and could contain both one way and two ways 
connections.   
2. Bandwidth limitations and variable ability links: Wireless links 
have considerable minimum loads than other similar versions. 
Beside, the actual throughput of wireless is frequently lower than 
a radio’s ultimate transmission average even if we include the 
effects of multiple accesses, waning, and the noise. Only one 
impact for the low to the average connections abilities is that 
congestion is the ordinary standard rather than the exception, that 
is, total application demand will possibly approach or exceed the 
network ability regularly. Mobile ad hoc users have to request 
services as in based network infrastructure. This is due to the fact 
it is an extension of based network infrastructure. Those requests 
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usually will rise as multi-media computing and cooperative 
networking applications rise. 
3. Energy limitation: The foundation in such network is power or 
other inexhaustible ways for their energy.  Saving power is the 
essential design in a MANET system. 
4. Physical security limitation: In general, Mobile ad hoc networks 
are additionally prone to threats in physical security than wired 
network. That will increase the chances for some kinds of attacks 
such as eavesdropping, denial of service and spoofing and these 
should be studied. To decrease the security threats in wireless 
networks, link security mechanisms are functional. In MANET 
which the no infrastructure based network has extra force to the 
single point of failure in the infrastructure based network. 
 
 
2.2 Routing Protocols in MANET 
 A routing process is constantly required to discover a path to send the 
packets correctly between the initiator and the target mobile nodes 
(Figure 2.2) because (a) in MANETs, there is no infrastructure support 
as is the case with wireless networks and (b) a target mobile node could 
be outside the initiator area. 
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Figure 2.2: Mobile Ad Hoc routing range coverage 
 
2.2.1 Challenges in Routing  
The design of a routing protocol for MANET is a major challenge [2, 
13]. Moreover, determining a packet route requires a node. This node 
needs to know at least the availability information to its neighbours. In 
this section, we will illustrate some of the challenges: 
1. Distributed network: MANET is a distributed wireless network 
with no infrastructure, implying that decentralized authority is 
required to maintain the status of the mobile nodes.  
2. Dynamic topology: The nodes are mobile and therefore the 
network is self-organizing. This can lead to changes in the 
topology of the wireless network over time. Therefore, routing 
protocols designed for such wireless networks must also be 
adaptive to the topology changes.  
12 
 
3. Power efficient: Since the mobile nodes in an ad hoc network 
usually run on portable batteries and are deployed in aggressive 
terrains, they have stringent power requirements. Hence, the 
protocols must be designed to save battery time. 
4. Network size: The ability to enable commercial applications such 
as voice transmission in conference, meetings, etc., is an attractive 
feature of ad hoc networks. However, the delay concernes in the 
underlying protocols places a strict upper bound on the size of the 
network.  
5. Security: Security in MANET is extremely necessary in such 
scenarios such as a battlefield. The five objectives of security are: 
availability, confidentiality, integrity authenticity and non-
repudiation [24] - are hard to obtain in MANET, because every 
mobile node in the network participates evenly in routing packets.  
2.2.2 Classification of Routing Protocols 
We can generally divide routing protocols in MANET into three groups 
[2] (Figure 2.3). The following paragraphs are based on [13] 
1. Proactive:  Each mobile node in the wireless network preserves a 
complete routing information for every mobile node in the wireless 
network by periodically updating the routing table even before it is 
needed [28]. Consequently, no delay to discover a path throughout 
the wireless network when a mobile node needs to transmit data 
packets. This type of routing protocol almost works similar way as 
routing protocols for wired networks. The thing is proactive 
protocols are not appropriate for a large network, as they need to 
maintaining mobile node entries for every mobile node in the 
routing table. That is a reason for causing more overhead in the 
routing table which leads to consumption of the bandwidth.  
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2. Reactive: Such a kind of routing, a mobile node maintains routes 
to send information to the target mobile node. These routes will 
expire after certain time if there is no communication between 
initiator and target mobile nodes. This protocol will look for a 
route if a mobile node needs to send information to another.  
 
3. Hybrid: Such a kind of routing protocols merges the features from 
the two types that have been explained above. Mobile nodes will 
be based on a specific geographical area or within a range from a 
concerned mobile node in the routing area and use proactive 
protocols. The communication among these mobile nodes in 
different areas will depend on reactive or proactive routing 
protocols.  
 
 
Figure 2.3 Categorization of Mobile Ad hoc Routing Protocols 
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The remainders of section 2.2 presents  survey of  the most two popular 
routing protocols used in (MANET): Dynamic Source Routing protocol 
(DSR) [29, 30] and Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing 
protocol (AODV) [31]. 
2.2.3 Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV): 
The AODV adopts different approaches on the basis of a function. To 
find routes, the AODV routing protocol [31] based on a reactive routing 
protocol. Beside that it uses a proactive routing if the AODV wants to 
discover the latest route. In order to find the latest routes it uses the route 
discovery and destination sequence numbers. The Route Discovery and 
Route Maintenance of AODV are described below, as discussed in Das 
(2003). 
Route Discovery 
In this step, Route Request (RREQ) packet is transferred by the initiator 
mobile node. According to [31], the fields in Route Request packet are 
source identifier (SId), destination identifier (DId), source sequence 
number (SSeq), destination sequence number (DSeq), broadcast 
identifier (BId), Time To Live (TTL). When the intermediate mobile 
node received the RREQ packet, it has two possibilities:  (a) broadcast 
the RREQ packet to the others if the intermediate mobile node didn’t 
have the route to the destination or (b) return to the source mobile node a 
Route Reply (RREP) packet if there is up to date route to the destination 
mobile node in its own cache. By using the (Sid) and (BId) as a pair, it 
will check if a specific RREQ has been received or not. This is done to 
prevent duplicates. While broadcasting the RREQ packet, each 
intermediate mobile node accesses the prior node’s address and its (BId). 
The node also keeps a timer connected with each access. This is done as 
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a try to delete a RREQ packet as long as the RREP has not been received 
before RREQ packet expired.  
[31] shows the Route Replay (RREP) packet stored the information 
about the previous mobile node once it has been received to transmit the 
packet to the next hop of the destination mobile node. By doing this, 
every mobile node includes just the next hop information; where in fact 
in the source routing, every intermediate mobile node on the route to the 
destination is stored.  
Figure 2.4 shows a case of route discovery in AODV [31]. In the 
paragraph below, it explains how this mechanism works (for a more 
detailed explanation, refer to [31]).  
Assume that mobile node called A needs to transmit a packet to mobile 
node called G but it does not have a route in his own cache. 
Consequently, G will start a route discovery mechanism by broadcasting 
(RREQ) packets to all neighbours next to mobile node A, which are in 
this case B, C and D. 
All fields which described above are added in the Route Request 
(RREQ) packet. When RREQ packet arrives to mobile nodes B, C and 
D, these mobile nodes directly look to their route’s caches for any 
available route. If there is no available route, then they will broadcast the 
RREQ packet to their neighbours; alternatively, there will be a 
comparison in the RREQ packet and the route cache for the DSeq. It 
returns toward the source mobile node a route replay (RREP) packet 
with the route to the destination if the DSeq in the RREQ packet is 
higher. As shown in Figure 2.4, mobile node C has a route to mobile 
node G in its own route cache and its DSeq is higher comparing with the 
RREQ packet. Accordingly, it transmits the RREP backwards to the 
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source mobile node A. By achieving that, mobile node A has been stored 
the route (A-C-F-G). A RREP packet is sent backward from the 
destination mobile node to the source as well. There will be an update in 
the intermediate mobile node’s routing table, which is in the route 
between the source and the destination mobile nodes, with the most 
recent DSeq in RREP packet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Route Discovery in AODV 
Route Maintenance 
Route Maintenance is illustrated in Figure 2.5. As described by [32],  at 
any time a mobile node detect a link disconnect through the link layer 
acknowledgements or HELLO messages, it will notify the source and 
ends mobile nodes by broadcasting a Route Error (RERR) packet. As 
shown in the figure 2.5 below, A RERR packets will be transmitted if 
there is disconnect between mobile nodes C and F on the route A-C-F-G 
by them to inform the source and the destination mobile nodes. 
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Figure 2.5: Route Maintenance in AODV 
2.2.4 Dynamic Source Routing protocol (DSR) 
Dynamic Source Routing Protocol [33] is an on-demand routing built on 
the idea of source routing. Johnson (2007: pp. 9-16) describes the DSR 
in details. The DSR works as follows. In the source routing, a sender 
mobile node has the complete route in the packet header that the packet 
must drive to get to the destination mobile node. Specifically, each 
mobile node in the route only sends the packet to its next hop, which has 
been allocated in the header. This happens with any check of its routing 
table while in table driven routing protocols. Moreover, the mobile node 
does not have to regularly transmit their routing table to the 
neighbouring mobile nodes. This will save lots of wireless network 
bandwidth. The two parts of the DSR procedure are described below, as 
in [33]: 
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Route Discovery  
The source mobile node looks for a route to the destination mobile node 
via transmitting (RREQ) packets to the all neighbours. Every neighbour 
who has received that packet will transmit to other neighbour, if RREQ 
has not been received before, if the Time to Live (TTL) field counter is 
higher than 0, else if it is not the destination mobile node of that RREQ 
packet, or if it has not been transmitted the RREQ packet to its 
neighbours. In addition, the mobile node can know if it has been 
received a specific (RREQ) packet before, by using Request ids. Every 
mobile node will update its table of RREQ packets which has been 
received recently. The table of RREQs include the initiator and request 
id fields. If the mobile node received two RREQs with same initiator 
and request id, then it will transmit just the first RREQ and reject the 
other. Furthermore, this technique prevents any routing loops in the 
wireless network. As soon as RREQ packet arrives to the destination 
mobile node it will transmit back a (RREP) packet to the same route it 
has been come from which include the traced route to the destination 
mobile node. An example has been shown in Figure 2.6. If mobile node 
S needs to transmit information to mobile node D, it will use the route 
discovery procedure and transmits a (RREQ) packet to its neighbours C, 
E, and A. In this example Mobile node E can receives more than RREQ 
packets from C and A. By the Route Discovery procedure it will drop 
both of the packets which have been received from mobile node S 
earlier. As soon as mobile node D received the RREQ packet, it will 
insert its address and the traced route, and then will send back (RREP) 
packet on the same route to the source mobile node.  
The destination mobile node sends the best route to the source mobile 
node (the first route that has been received) and saves the other routes in 
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the route cache the other routes to be used in the future. A route cache is 
present in each mobile node and it is updated regularly. Thus, at any 
time a mobile node receives a (RREQ) and finds a route to the 
destination mobile node in its own cache, it will send back a (RREP) 
packet to the source mobile node without broadcasting it further.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Route Discover in DSR 
 
Route Maintenance 
The route maintenance is achieved as soon as there is a broken link 
among two nodes. According to Reference [33], there are two ways by 
which a node can find a broken link:  (a) by negative controller the link 
or; (b) by active controller the link. The example in Figure 2.7 shows a 
route error (RERR) sent back from mobile node B to notify the source 
mobile node S that the link (B-D) is broken. Thereafter, the source 
mobile node will restart the route discovery procedure to look for a new 
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route. In addition, it eliminates any route it might have in its own cache 
to such destination. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Route Maintenance in DSR 
Dynamic source Routing (DSR) protocol gets important advantages 
from the source routing because the intermediate mobile nodes do not 
require: (a) to keep updating the route information to direct the packets 
that has been received and (b) to have every routing advertisement 
packets. But, a problem arises because the network size increases. This 
is because the routing overhead indeed rises as every packet has to take 
the whole route along with it to the destination. The authors in [34] 
suggest that one way of decreasing the propagation delay is through the 
use of route caches. In addition, as long as there is a link broken the 
(RERR) packet broadcasts immediately to the source mobile node, in 
order to start a route discovery procedure. Some researchers proposed 
some improvements to DSR, such as non- propagating route request, 
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which will avoid from re-broadcasting, and gratuitous route replies, 
once the mobile node find a packet with its own address been in the 
header, that mobile node will transmit a RREP to the source mobile node 
by passing the previous hops   [30].  
 
2.3 Security in MANET 
To develop good security solutions, we should know the possible form 
of attacks. In MANET, broadcasting wireless medium naturally indicates 
that attacks possibly will come from any route and from different layers. 
One of the main security obstructions in MANET is the absence of fixed 
infrastructure support, which makes it impossible to use existing trusted 
nodes. 
2.3.1 Security objectives: 
It is crucial to secure the routing protocols in MANETs. Different 
security services have been looked at: availability, confidentiality, 
integrity, authentication and non-repudiation [3, 14, 15]. These are 
discussed below, based on [16], 
Availability Assure the permanence of the services of the network in 
spite of attacks. A Denial-of-Service (DoS) is a potential threat at any 
layer of a mobile ad hoc network. On the media access control (MAC) 
layer, an attacker could jam the physical communication channels. On 
the network layer disruption of the routing operation may result in a 
partition of the network, rendering certain nodes inaccessible. On higher 
levels, an attacker could minimize high-level services such as key 
management service.  
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Confidentiality guarantees that particular information is not at all 
revealed to unauthorized nodes. It is of paramount importance to 
strategic or tactical military communications. Routing information has to 
stay also confidential in some situations, because the information may be 
valuable for attackers to trace their targets.  
Integrity ensures that a message that is on the way to the destination is 
never corrupted. Channel noise or malicious attacks on the network 
could corrupt the message. 
Authentication is to ensure the peer mobile node’s identity. With no 
authentication, any attacker might masquerade as a normal mobile node, 
so they going to get a benefit of accessing to the sensitive information. 
Non-repudiation guarantees that the initiator of any message cannot 
deny that it is the real initiator. Non-repudiation is important for 
discovering and removing of compromised mobile nodes.  
Networking environment in wireless schemes makes the routing 
protocols vulnerable to attacks. Such attacks are varied and can variety 
from passive attacks like eavesdropping to active attacks such as 
impersonation, message replay, message dropping, network partitioning, 
etc... Eavesdropping is a threat to confidentiality and active attacks are 
threats to availability, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. 
Mobile nodes roaming in a mobile ad hoc environment with bad 
physical security are quite vulnerable and they may be compromised. 
Compromised mobile nodes can next be used as starting points to initiate 
attacks against the routing protocols.  
2.3.2 Attacks 
There are various ways of categorizing attacks in the MANETs – for 
example, passive and active attacks which focus on the behavior of the 
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attacks themselves; external and internal attacks which focus on the 
source of the attacks; mobile and wired attacks which look on the 
processing capabilities of the attackers and finally, single and multiple 
attacks which relate to the number of the attackers. In this section, it 
focuses on passive and active attacks. These are the main problems for 
MANETs.   
2.3.2.1 Passive Attacks 
Passive attacks  “are launched to steal valuable information in the 
targeted networks and to detect such attack is difficult because neither 
the system resources nor the critical network functions are physically 
affected to prove the intrusions” [17]2004, p.149).   Eavesdropping and 
traffic analysis attacks are examples of such attacks.  
2.3.2.1.1 Eavesdropping 
Eavesdropping attack is a method of collecting information by spying on 
broadcasted data on authentic network [19]. Although eavesdrop 
privately overhears the communication, the information remains intact. 
However, privacy is endangering. This kind of attack is very easy for the 
malicious mobile node to carry out as it relates to the tradition wired 
network. Eavesdropping attack in mobile ad hoc network works in the 
following way [18]: 
(a)   It shares the wireless medium by working in the promiscuous mode. 
This allows a network device to interrupt and read every packet in the 
network that received.  
(b) The attacker mobile node interrupts the communication. This can 
easily be achieved since each MANET node is transceiver fitted in the 
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communication range.  A malicious mobile node can decode the 
information to aim the authorized mobile node on the wireless network. 
(c) The malicious mobile node can then remain the sensitive 
information, alter the route or modify the routing table with wrong 
information.  
Such process can pose a serious threat to the wireless network resource 
and decrease the performance of the wireless network.        
2.3.2.1.2 Traffic Analysis  
Traffic analysis remains a serious but subtle security attack. Traffic 
analysis works in the following way:  adversaries attempt to discover the 
identities of the parties in the communication. Once they have achieved 
this, they can analyze the traffic to find out the wireless network traffic 
style and route the changes in the traffic style [20]. Such an attack 
involving leakage of information can have serious implications in 
security sensitive scenarios. 
2.3.2.2 Active Attacks  
Active attack, as discussed in [21], involves information interception, 
alteration, or fabrication, in this way will disrupt the standard  operations 
of a MANET. Figure 2.8 
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Figure 2.8: Classification of active attacks on MANET routing protocols 
 
2.3.2.2.1 Impersonation Attacks 
This type of attacks violates authenticity and confidentiality in a 
network. A malicious node can impersonate or spoof the address of 
another node to modify the image of the network topology as perceived 
by another node. An example is described in Figure 2.9 below [22]. 
Mobile node S needs to send a data to mobile node D and starts the 
Route Discovery procedure. The malicious mobile node M, closer to 
node S than node D, impersonates node D as D’. It forwards a (RREP) to 
mobile node S. Without checking the authenticity of the RREP, mobile 
node S accepts the route which is in the RREP packet and starts to send 
data to the malicious node. This type of attacks can cause a routing loop 
within the network.  
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Figure 2.9:  Example of impersonation attack 
 
2.3.2.2.2 Modification Attacks 
In this type of attacks, some of the protocol fields of the messages 
passed between the mobile nodes are modified, thereby resulting in 
traffic subversion, or redirection attacks. The following sections discuss 
some of these attacks: 
1. Modification of route sequence numbers:  This attack is possible 
against the AODV protocol. The malicious mobile node can alter 
the sequence number in the RREQ packets or RREP packets in 
order to make the route fresh. In Figure 2.10, malicious mobile 
node M receives the route request RREQ from mobile node B that 
originates from mobile node S and is prepared for mobile node D. 
M forwards a RREP to B with a large destination sequence number 
for D than the value last announced by D. The mobile node S 
accepts the RREP and then sends the data to D through M. When 
the legitimate RREP from D gets to S, if the destination number is 
less than the one announced by M, it will be discarded as a stale 
route. The situation will not be corrected until a valid RREP with 
higher sequence number than that of M gets to S. 
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2. Modification of hop count: This type of attacks is possible against 
the AODV protocol where a malicious mobile node can increase 
the chance that it is included in a recently generated route by 
resetting the hop count’s field of a RREQ packet to a lower 
number or even zero. Similar to route modification attack with 
sequence number, the hop count’s field in the routing packets is 
modified to attract data traffic. 
3. Modification of source route: This attack is possible against DSR 
which uses source routes and works as illustrated in Figure 2.10. In 
Figure 2.10, it is assumed that the shortest path exists from S to D. 
It is also assumed that mobile nodes C and D cannot listen to each 
other, mobile nodes B and C cannot listen to each other, and M is a 
malicious mobile node trying the denial-of-service attack. Assume 
S forwards a data packet to D with the route (S-A-B-C-X-D). If M 
intercepts this packet, it removes X from the list and forwards it to 
C. C will attempt to forward this packet to D which is not possible 
since C cannot listen to D. Thus M has successfully launched a 
DoS attack on D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Example of route sequence number modification attack 
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2.3.2.2.3 Fabrication Attacks 
In this type of attacks, a malicious mobile node attempts to inject fake 
messages or routing packets to disrupt the routing mechanism. These 
attacks are difficult to detect in a MANET since the routing packets 
appear to be legitimate packets to the nodes processing them.  Attacks 
by fabrication are discussed in [22, 23]. Figure 2.11 exemplifies this type 
of attacks (Huang and Lee 2004). Mobile node S needs to send data 
packet to mobile node D. So it broadcasts RREQs in order to discover 
the route to mobile node D. Malicious mobile node M pretends to have a 
cached route to the destination D, as well as backward RREP to the 
source mobile node S. The source S, without checking the validity of the 
RREP, accepts the RREP and starts to send data through M. 
Furthermore, malicious nodes can fabricate RERR to advertise a link 
break to a certain node in a MANET with AODV or DSR protocols.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11:  Example of a fabrication attack 
2.3.2.2.4 Denial of Service 
According to [24], Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks might be appeared 
from different layers. Denial of Service is a kind of attack in which 
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no access to the system(s) is gained, but rather availability to network 
services is affected. 
For example, suppose that mobile node D listen to mobile node C, and 
mobile node B listen to mobile node M.  Source mobile node S sends 
data for destination D using the route (S-A-M-B-C-D). Mobile node A 
forward packets to mobile node M, and mobile node M alter the route 
(S-A-M-B-C-D) in (S-A-M-B-D), Mobile node B will send backward a 
route Error RRER (broken link) to source mobile node S. As a result, 
malicious mobile node M will drop the route error RRER packet. As 
shown in figure 2.12. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12:  Example of Denial of service attack 
 
2.3.2.2.5 Wormhole Attack 
The wormhole attack [25] is a severe type of attacks in which two 
malicious nodes can forward packets through a private “tunnel” in the 
network as shown in Figure 2.13.  
For example, M and N are two malicious mobile nodes which link 
through a private connection. Each packet that M receives from the 
wireless network is forwarded through “wormhole” to mobile node N, 
and vice versa. This kind of attack will interrupt the routing protocols 
via short looping to the normal flow of routing packets. Such a type of 
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attack is difficult to detect in a network, and may severely damage 
communication among the nodes. Such an attack can be prevented by 
using packet leashes [25], which authenticate the timing information in 
the packets to detect faked packets in the network. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13:  Example of wormhole attack 
 
2.3.3 Cryptography 
Encryption requires two communication parties to possess two objects; 
firstly an encryption algorithm and secondly an encryption key. 
Encryption algorithms are generally publicly known and available for 
security, meaning a non-secret agreement can be made as to the 
algorithm to use. This leaves the encryption key which either must 
remain secret when exchanged or a method must be used where publicly 
disclosing the key does not allow an attacker to decrypt messages that 
are encrypted with the key. A full encryption key management system 
(KMS) will perform more than mere key exchange. It will allow for 
creation, distribution, updating if necessary and destruction of the key. 
Further description details are analysed in chapter 4. 
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2.3.4 Trust Model 
Trust can be defined as confident dependence between mobile nodes 
in the network. There are three types of trust models in MANETs: a) 
Reputation trust model, b) Recommendation trust model, and c) 
combination of Direct and recommendation trust model. Further 
description about trust, trust calculations and trust model are analyzed in 
Chapter 6.   
 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter provides an overview of the MANETs which are formed 
due to the absence of any infrastructure and work wirelessly and moving 
freely to perform a provisional wireless communication among the 
mobile nodes. Furthermore, it explains the characters and the challenges 
that affect MANET and gives a brief description of the routing protocols 
and their challenges, focusing on two routing protocols AODV and 
DSR.  This chapter also discusses security issues in MANETs.  It 
classifies the attacks that are possible against the existing routing 
protocols. An understanding of these attacks and their impacts on the 
routing mechanism will help researchers in designing secure routing 
protocols. Cryptography is a main factor to protect and secure the 
important information among the parties.    
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CHAPTER 3: CRYPTOGRAPGHY IN ROUTING 
PROTOCOLS 
 
This chapter focuses on cryptography. After a short introduction and 
some background information on the topic, It discusses the different 
types of cryptography analysis following [35-47]. The fourth section, 
based on [48]  and [49], describes the Hash function. In Section 3.5, it 
discusses Key Management using materials from [50]. The chapter ends 
with a brief summary. 
3.1 Introduction 
Cryptography is a technique to store and send information among whose 
can read and treat. This could be described as a scientific way to save the 
data by encrypting it to make it difficult to read for later decryption only 
by authorized parties. [35] (2003, p.659) argues that “Cryptography is an 
effective way of protecting sensitive information as it is stored on media 
or transmitted through untrusted network communication paths”. 
According to [51], cryptography techniques also enable secure 
communication in both wired and wireless networks. Symmetric key 
cryptography has computation efficiency, but it also has weaknesses in 
the management of secret key. Asymmetric key cryptography is widely 
used because of its simplicity in key distribution. Nevertheless, this 
technique depends on a centralized infrastructure and is resource 
expensive. 
3.2 Background 
According to [52] (1996, p.2) and [35] (2003, p.669), cryptography has a 
number of objectives. These are: 
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1. Confidentiality: It stops all but those allowed to have access to the 
content of the data. Confidentiality can be achieved through various 
means. These range from physical to mathematical methods. [35] 
(2003, p.669) gives the following example to illustrate this point. 
Suppose the data to be secured, for instance the key, is stored in an 
accessible place only by allowed users. By using the encryption the 
data can be encrypted to only who has the appropriate keys and also 
identify the encryption algorithm. Only this user is capable to 
decrypt the message. Encryption can be categorising as: Symmetric 
key (Section 3.3.1) and Asymmetric key (Section 3.3.2). 
2. Integrity: It stops not permitted users from modifying the messages.  
Data integrity can only be guaranteed through the detection of all 
unauthorized manipulation of information, such as elimination or 
injection. To achieve the data integrity there is one cryptographic 
approach which is digital signatures (Section 3.3.2.2) and hash 
functions (Section 3.4).  
3. Authentication: This authentication is categorized into two types: 
entity authentication and data origin authentication [36]. In the first 
type, a user accessing any communication session has to identify 
himself to the other users. In the second type, any data to be sent has 
to be authenticated as regards to its data content or time of sending.   
4. Non-repudiation: It stops any entity from rejecting any past actions. 
The other meaning is a process whereby the sender who sends the 
data is given proof of delivery. With regards to the receiver, he/she is 
made aware of the identity of the sender; therefore neither can later 
reject to have processed the information. For instance, if there is a 
user who affords electronic order should not be able to deny it later. 
One of the cryptographic approaches to achieve non-repudiation is 
digital signatures (Section 3.3.2.2). 
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5. Availability: The service should be available all the time. It must be 
robust for two reasons: (a)   to withstand network failures and (b) to 
resist (DoS) attacks.  
In cryptography, unique data transmitted from one user to another is 
called plain text [36]. This plain text is transformed to cipher text by 
encryption’s procedure which is a particular algorithm or function. The 
authentic receiver can decrypt (decode) the cipher text which reveres 
into plain text by decryption’s procedure. Mathematically, if M appears 
as a plain text of a message and C appears as a cipher text of a message, 
subsequently: 
Encryption ∷ E(Μ)  = C     and     Decryption ∷ D(M)   = M, 
Encryption and decryption procedures are administrated by keys. These 
keys are small size of data used by cryptography algorithms. In addition, 
these keys have to be saved to guarantee the security of the system. This 
kind of keys is called secret key. Additionally, the key management is a 
term used to refer to the secure administration of cryptography keys.  
Cryptography algorithms are of two main types: (a) symmetric key that 
apply one key for encryption and also for decryption, and (b) asymmetric 
key that used two distinct keys for encryption and decryption [35]. In the 
following sections, I discuss these two Cryptography algorithms, digital 
signature, digital certificates, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and Web 
of Trust (WoT) models. 
3.3 Cryptography Types  
3.3.1 Symmetric Cryptography 
In traditional cryptography, symmetric key algorithms are based on the 
use of the shared key - by both parties, that is, the sender and the 
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receiver.– This has been arranged previously for exchange between 
them, for instance, via a secure communication channel [35].  
According to [35], this shared key, which has been exchanged, is used 
for encryption and decryption. In the symmetric key, the sender and the 
receiver apply a private key (K) to encrypt and decrypt. Symmetric 
encryption, as discussed by [36],  is illustrated in Figure 3.1. [36] 
describes this process in the following way: there are two users (called 
Alice and Bob). User Alice can encrypt the plain text m by the shared 
key k and transform it to a cipher text c. User Bob can decrypt the cipher 
text c by the same shared key k that has been used for encryption and re-
transform it to plain text m. 
Symmetric key algorithms are of two kinds: (a) stream ciphers and (b) 
block ciphers. These differ in the way in which they encrypt the 
messages. “Block ciphers operate on blocks of plain text and cipher text 
– usually of 64 bits but sometime longer. Stream ciphers operate on 
stream of plain text and cipher text one bit or byte (sometimes even one 
32 bit word) at a time” [37]1996, p.189). Nechvatal et al. (2000) have 
reached the 128-bit block cipher and it is a standard of AES (Advanced 
Encryption Standard) algorithm which has been officially agreed by 
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) in October 2000 
[53]. 
[35] explains how symmetric key algorithms are efficient in that they 
can usually execute electronically quickly. But they also have certain 
limitations since they require a private key to be shared among the 
sender and receiver. When a connection between mobile nodes needs to 
be recognized, all of the sender and the receiver pair should share a key. 
This, in turn, creates a non-scalable system. Use of the same key among 
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more than two mobile nodes will result in a breach of security. This, in 
turn, makes the whole system vulnerable. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Symmetric key algorithm 
 
3.3.2 Asymmetric Cryptography 
There are problems in key management in the symmetric key. These 
have been solved in Asymmetric key (public key), proposed by a 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976. Public key can be defined 
as a format of cryptography where any user can have a pair of keys, 
which are called public and private keys. The procedure is to keep the 
private key secret, besides the public key can be widely distributed to all 
users in the network. Both keys are related mathematically. However, it 
is impossible to derive the private key is impossible from the public key 
in any way. Any message encrypted by public key only will be 
decrypted by corresponding private key [38]. 
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Figure 3.2 shows the public key scheme clearly. [38] explains the 
process in the following way. Firstly, both users Alice and Bob must 
have two different keys which are the public and the private keys. If the 
user Alice needs to transmit an encrypted message M to the user Bob, 
she first of all gets Bob’s public key (PKBob) and this key should be 
authenticated. Bob’s public key can encrypt Alice’s message M and 
transform it to cipher text C. Then, the user Bob can decrypt the cipher 
text by identical private key (SKBob) which just the user Bob knows of. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Asymmetric key algorithm 
 
The two major sections of public key are [54]:  
• Public key encryption — to ensure confidentiality, a message 
should be encrypted with a recipient's public key which cannot be 
decrypted by anyone except by the recipient possessing the 
corresponding private key. 
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• Digital signatures — to guarantee authenticity, integrity and 
non-repudiation, a message signed with a sender's private key can 
be confirmed by everyone who has admission to the sender's 
public key, thus confirming that the sender signed it and that the 
message not been altered. 
3.3.2.1 Public key 
The main issue with the public key is to confirm it is genuine, and has 
not been altered or exchanged by any malicious user [39]. The use of 
Public Key infrastructure (PKI), in which one or more third parties, 
called Certificate Authorities (CA), confirm the ownership of the key 
pairs is one way of overcoming this problem. Another approach, used by 
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), is the Web of Trust (WoT) technique to 
guarantee the authenticity the pairs of key. 
“A very popular example of public key cryptography is the RSA system 
developed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman, which is based on the 
integer factorization problem” [39] 1996, p.89). In RSA mechanism, to 
encrypt any plain text m or decrypt any cipher text c, the next 
mathematic computations are executed: 
    C = M
e
 mod N 
    M = C
d
 mod N 
“A major benefit of public key cryptography is that it provides a method 
for employing digital signatures” [40]2008, p.35).These : (a) allow the 
receiver of the data to confirm the authenticity of the origin for the data;  
(b) maintain the data complete and undamaged; and (c) prevent the 
sender from claiming that user did not transmit the message.  Therefore, 
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public key digital signatures preserve the authentication, the data 
integrity and the non-repudiation. 
3.3.2.2 Digital Signature 
Digital signature is based on the same principle as the handwritten 
signature. However, the handwritten signature can be forged easily. The 
digital signature is more advanced than the handwritten signature 
because it is impossible to emulate it. In addition, it asserts to the 
contents of the data and the identity of the signer. 
Figure 3.3 below, based on [39] (1996: pp.22-23), illustrates the way in 
which digital signatures are generated.  The data is encrypted with the 
sender‘s private key and not with someone else’s public key. For 
example, if the data can be decrypted with the sender A’s public key, so 
it must have been created by that sender A. 
Figure 3.3 shows that user Alice needs to transmit a message m to user 
Bob which is signed by her (Alice). [41] (1995, p.19-22] explains the 
various stages in this process. User Alice applies the hash digest of m 
and her private key to generate the signature. Firstly, she will use a hash 
function on m and calculate the hash digest. Secondly, she will encrypt 
this digest by her private key (SKAlice ) then transmit it with the message 
to the user Bob. Then, Bob recalculates the digest by using the same 
hash function on m which has been received and match it with the digest 
outcome from decrypting the signature by the Alice’s public key 
(PKAlice). As a result, if both digests are equal, then m originates from 
Alice and has not been modified. 
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Figure 3.3: Digital Signature 
 
3.3.2.3 Public key encryption schemes 
Many of the public key techniques are related to mathematical issues, as 
listed in Table 3.1 based on [42] (2008, p.88).  
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Public key encryption scheme mathematical issue 
RSA (a) integer factorization problem 
(b) RSA problem 
Rabin  (a) integer factorization problem 
(b) square roots modulo composite n 
ElGamal (a) discrete logarithm problem 
(b) Diffie-Hellman problem 
generalized ElGamal (a) generalized discrete logarithm 
problem 
(b) generalized Diffie-Hellman 
problem 
McEliece (a) linear code decoding problem 
  Table 3.1: Some public key encryption schemes 
 
3.3.3 Digital certificates 
An important aspect of public cryptography is that users want to 
ascertain that they are encrypting to the accurate identity. This is because 
in “an environment where it is safe to exchange keys freely via public 
servers, man-in-the-middle attacks are a potential threat” [43] 2002, 
p.67). This type of attack is dangerous in that not only can it read the 
messages between two parties but it can also insert and modify them at 
will.  This process can happen without the parties’ knowledge that the 
connection among them has been compromised. In this way, the attacker 
has to be capable to monitor and interrupt these messages passing among 
the two victims. The following paragraphs explain this process further 
by referring to Figure 3.3 above and also on [44]. 
Suppose Alice needs to transmit a secure message to Bob, she then asks 
for Bob’s public key. Suppose there is a third party called Emma who 
can interrupt the messages among Alice and Bob. If Emma is capable to 
get Bob’s public key, this will allow the man-in-the-middle attack to 
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start. The attack will work in this manner: firstly, Emma will act as 
Bob’s identity and transmit her public key to Alice instead of the public 
key of Bob. Then, as soon as Alice receives Emma’s public key, she will 
think that it actually belongs to Bob’s public key and she will apply it to 
encrypt the message and then transmit it back to Bob. Again this 
encrypted message is interrupted by Emma. 
Now, Emma can decrypt the message by her private key. She saves a 
copy of the message and re-encrypts it by using the Bob’s public key. 
When this message is received by Bob, he will think that it was 
transmitted by Alice (Wu 2007). “This example shows the need for 
Alice and Bob to have some way of ensuring that they are truly using 
each other's public keys rather than the public key of an attacker. 
Otherwise, such attacks would be generally possible, in principle, 
against any message sent using public-key technology” [48]2009, p.1-
24). 
Man-in-the middle attacks, such as the one described above, can be 
prevented by the use of digital certificates. “A digital certificate is an 
electronic document which incorporates a digital signature to bind 
together a public key with an identity-information, such as the name of a 
person or an organization and their address” [46]2008, p.209).  It is used 
to check that public key applies to a singular entity. [47] explains that in 
a model of public key infrastructure (PKI) system, the signature will be 
of a Trusted Third Party (TTP) known as Certificate Authority (CA).  
X.509 is a commonly used as a standard for clarifying digital certificates 
subsequent the PKI system. It is released as ITU recommendation ITU-T 
X.509 [55]. The X.509’s format, which is version 3, digital certificate, is 
shown in Figure 3.4 according to [55] . 
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Version 
Serial Number 
Algorithm ID 
Issuer 
Validity 
Subject 
Public Key Information 
Issuer Unique Identifier (optional) 
Subject Unique Identifier (optional) 
Extensions (optional) 
Certificates Signature Algorithm 
Certificate Authority Signature 
Figure 3.4: X.509 Digital certificate format 
 
3.4 Hash Function  
Hash function is frequently known as a unidirectional hash function.  It 
is considered as one of the essential primal in the present area of 
cryptography [48]. [48] 2009, p.13) explains that a hash function H is a 
conversion by taking a message m and return it as a fixed size chain 
known as hash value h.  This conversion is represented as the equation 
H(.), to be exact, [h = H(m)]. Hash functions only with this attribute 
have many common mathematical uses. Those used in cryptography has 
several additional attributes [49] 2008). These are explored in the 
following paragraphs. There is no size limitation in the cryptographic 
hash function input. Compared with the output, it has to be of limited 
size.  In addition, hash function has to be simple to calculate. 
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Additionally, the hash function must be unidirectional and collision free. 
If it is difficult to reverse, that is,  it is one way hash function [56]. A 
hash function can be weakly collision free or strongly collision free [57]. 
We have a weakly collision free hash function, if given a message x, it is 
mathematically impossible to apply finding a message y 6= x such that 
H(x) = H(y). On the other hand, we have a strongly collision free hash 
function if it is mathematically impossible to apply finding x and y 
messages such that H(x) = H(y). 
The hash value appears in brief with respect to the longer message from 
which it was calculated; this value is known as message digest. A 
message digest, therefore, can be understood as a digital fingerprint of 
the major message. Examples of famous hash functions are MD-family 
(MD2 [58], MD4 [59, 60], and MD5 [61], RipeMD-family (RIPEMD-
128 [62], RIPEMD-160 [62], RIPEMD-256 [62], RIPEMD-320 [62], 
and SHA-family (SHA-1 [63], [64], SHA-256 [64], and SHA-384 [64], 
SHA-512 [64]. 
According to [42], the majority of cryptography functions apply 
compression functions to compress the information. The compression 
function works in the following way: it gets a limited size of input and 
gives a shorter limited size of output. For a specific compression 
function, we can describe the hash function as repeating the compression 
function till the whole message has been processed. “In this process, a 
message of arbitrary length is broken into blocks whose length depends 
on the compression function, and padded so that the size of the message 
is a multiple of the block size” [42] 2008, p.130). For instance, SHA-1 
block size and RIPEMD-160 block size are 512 bits. 
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3.5 Key Management  
Cryptography works as a security system to preserve the confidentiality, 
the integrity, and the authentication as long as the keys are not 
compromised whatsoever. [35] explains how the capture, modification, 
corruption or disclosure of the keys to unauthorized individuals can lead 
to the whole cryptosystem becoming compromised.  Cryptography 
depends on a trust model. Trust works at the level of individuals – they 
trust everyone in the network to defend their keys and also trust the 
administrator who maintains the keys – and at the level of administrators 
– they also trust the server that saves, maintains, and deploys the keys.    
Key management is the essential section of any secure communication, 
as shown by [45]. The majority of cryptography systems depend on 
some underlying secure, strong, and effective key management system. 
Key management covers several aspects including key creation, storage, 
deploying, updating, cancellation, and certificate service, according to 
security policies [65]. If any key is exposed, the encrypted data would 
not be protected from malicious attacks. The privacy of the symmetric 
key and private key has to be guaranteed assuredly. In fact, both Key 
distribution and key agreement over unsecure channel formally are in a 
high chance of risk and also vulnerable from feasible attacks. In the 
classical digital envelop way, one side produces a session key and 
encrypts it with the public key algorithm. After such a generation and 
encryption, the other side receives and recovers it. In the Diffie-Hellman 
(DH) system, as elaborated in [51] (2005, p.3), communication on both 
sides shares some public information and creates a session key on both 
sides. A number of difficult key exchange or distribution protocols and 
frameworks have been designed and made. Nevertheless, the calculation 
load and complexity of these protocols have been limited by (MANETs). 
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According to [45], this is due to a number of factors including the node’s 
lack of resource availability, mobility and network synchronization 
complexity. Strong key attacks remain a threat. It is therefore essential to 
protect Key integrity and ownership.  
Various techniques such as Digital Signature, Message Digest and 
Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) are used to authenticate 
data or to maintain the integrity.  As shown by [46]2008, p.484), “public 
key is protected by public-key certificate where a trusted entity known 
as the certification authority (CA) in PKI vouches the binding of the 
public key with owner’s identity”. In methods where there is no trusted 
third party (TTP), public key certificate has to be ensured in a different 
way. Certification is then achieved through peer nodes in a distributed 
method, such as pretty good privacy (PGP). Clearly, the purpose of key 
authentication is that the certificate can prove the ownership of the key 
rather than decide whether it is good or not. After certain valid period of 
usage, the key might be compromised or disposed of. As the key should 
not be used again after it has been discovered, some techniques are 
required to revoke the compromised key in the period where it has not 
yet expired. As explained by [51] (2005, p.5), the certificate “contains 
the lifetime of validity. If the key is expired, it is not useful. However, 
the private key maybe is able to be disclosed during the valid period. In 
this case, certificate authority (CA) needs to revoke this certificate 
explicitly and notify the network by using the certificate revocation list 
(CRL) to prevent its invalid usage”. Key maintenance is a very 
important factor in securing a communications network.  It is used to 
encrypt and decrypt messages. The keys also have to meet certain 
conditions and fulfill some specific functions: (a) distribution:  securely 
to the right entities and updated continuously; (b) protection:  when 
47 
 
being transmitted and stored on each workstation and server; (c) 
generation, destruction and proper recovery: these need to happen on 
demand by authorized individuals.   
The keys must be stored securely before and after distribution. As soon 
as the key is distributed, it does not exist to be found in any location. It 
needs a secure place to be stored and applied only in the controlled 
method. Indeed, the “keys, the algorithm that will use the key, 
configurations, and parameters are stored in a module that also needs to 
be protected.  If an attacker were able to obtain these components, she 
could masquerade as another user and decrypt, read, and re-encrypt 
messages that were not intended for her” [35]2003, p.557). [66] (2005, 
p.32) further explain that a “Key Management System (KMS) creates, 
distributes, and manages these certificates. Thus, the KMS is at the heart 
of the network’s defenses. A KMS provides high service availability in 
highly partitioned networks, requires minimal pre-configuration during 
the network deployment phase, and can accommodate new nodes joining 
the network”. 
3.5.1 Key Exchange 
“Key exchange is the most primitive form of key management.  People 
wishing to communicate over an insecure channel must exchange a 
cryptographic key” [50] 2003, p.1). The initial version of the key 
management was the physical key exchange, if it can be explained as 
key management in any way.  Generally, key exchange is the majority of 
“inconvenient” [50] 2003, p.1) method of generating a secure 
relationship between two communicating entities.  But it is essential to 
use this method in some cases. Indeed, according to [50] (2003, p.1),  in 
“some ad hoc networking scenarios, it is NOT inconvenient”  but it is 
actually a requirement. “Thus, for small personal area networks or 
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similar scenarios, physical key exchange must be both logical and 
convenient” (Lehane et al. 2003, p.1). 
3.5.2 Key Agreement and Group Keying 
“Group keying allows multiparty secure communications, and hence 
provides group level authentication and security” [50] 2003, p.2).  
Nevertheless, giving the keying information for single members of the 
group (for example, to permit the members to communicate in privacy in 
the presence of other members of the group) needs other predetermined 
key agreements. In fact, networks might design where group 
membership does not exist, especially in a wide range national network.  
Essentially, any group key agreement is of restricted use in a non group 
oriented network, like a civilian network that lots of mobile nodes select 
to transmit but some require continuous confidentiality. For this reason, 
a “public key infrastructure is better suited to this scenario” [50] 2003, 
p.2). 
 
3.6 Summary: 
This chapter provides an overview of the cryptography in routing 
protocols. Furthermore, it gives an introduction and a background by 
state the cryptography objectives. This chapter also discusses the 
cryptography types which include the Symmetric cryptography, 
Asymmetric cryptography and Digital certificates. Indeed, in the 
chapter, we give a description of a hash function and key management 
and how a group keying gives the level of authentication.       
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CHAPTER 4: SECURITY 
 
This chapter introduces applications of secured routing protocols ARAN 
and Ariadne in some interesting examples.  
 
4.1 Security Examples 
4.1.1 ARAN 
Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) was proposed by 
[23]. Authors present in their research the probable security uses against 
the routing protocols in MANET. Particularly, the attacks which are 
used against the AODV [32] and DSR [29]. The route discovery stage in 
ARAN routing protocol is depend on AODV and DSR, but the explained 
attacks are decreased by amount of extensions to the protocol.  
Route discovery  
ARAN needs both of the Route Requests (RREQs) and Route Replies 
(RREPs) to be signed. According to [23], this is done in the interest of 
(a) authentication: to prevent spoofing of node identity; (b) integrity: to 
ensure about the packet not been adjusted from the time when generated; 
and (c) non-repudiation: to capture any internals malicious mobile node 
for instances, mobile nodes has a genuine certificate and the identical 
key pair). [23] (2002, p.5) explain this process in detail. A summary of 
their explanation follows.   Suppose mobile node S needs to establish a 
route to mobile node D. Just one route to D is the intermediate mobile 
nodes A and B. Consequently, the route should be (S-A-B-D). Firstly, 
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mobile node S starts a route discovery packet (RDP), similar to the 
(RREQ), and transmits it to the all mobile nodes in the network. 
The sender S will sign the message. At the same time as the packet is 
received by the intermediate mobile node A, it will check the accuracy 
of the packet such as certiﬁcates, addresses and signatures. The 
intermediate mobile node will sign on it and attach its own certificate if 
it is accurate; and so on with next mobile node to check the accuracy of 
the packet. Once the packet comes correctly to the intermediate mobile 
node it will delete the previous mobile node’s certificate and signature 
and replaced with its own certificate and signature. Then transmit the 
packet to the next mobile node and will be checked through the route to 
the destination. If the RDP packet arrived to the destination mobile node 
D, it will create and send backward a RREP packet through the reverse 
route to the source mobile node. 
For the RREP packet procedure it is the same as explained in RDP 
packet for checking the certificate and signature. ARAN protocol instead 
of using the hop count to select a route it will select the fastest RDP 
packet travel from source to destination. This procedure will avoid the 
attacks whereas any cooperative malicious mobile node will show every 
route appear as a shorter route if it is travel via them.  This kind of attack 
called “tunneling” attack; the malicious mobile node will cover the 
RREQ packet and transmit it to nearest malicious mobile node to the 
destination. Once the other malicious mobile node receives it will 
uncover it and transmit it to the destination. In this stage, the route 
request appears to the destination with extremely low hop count, as it 
has a high probability to be chosen if the hop count is used to evaluate 
the route quality. 
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4.1.2 Ariadne 
Ariadne is a secured routing protocol proposed by [6] and [7], and is 
based on DSR routing protocol. It depends on symmetric cryptography 
(Hu et al. 2002). It ensures the authentication and the integrity of the 
routing packets: 
1. Destination mobile node of a route discovery procedure can 
validate the source node.  
2. Source mobile node can validate every intermediate mobile node 
present on the route to the destination in the RREP messages; also 
can ensure that no intermediate mobile node is removed from the 
mobile node list in RREQ or RREP packets. 
The authentication in Ariadne for the routing packets can be in three 
ways. It can use any of the following schemes [6]2002, p.21):  
1. “Shared keys between all pairs of nodes”,  
2. “Shared keys between communicating nodes combined with 
broadcast authentication”,  
3. “Digital signatures”.  
Authors assume that there exists a key distribution scheme for each 
authentication scheme. The next section discusses the use of Ariadne 
with Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) [26], 
a  scheme that request time synchronization. Synchronization can be 
avoided if pair-wise shared keys are used.  Additional protocol 
optimizations can also be achieved by broadcast authentication such as 
TESLA. Ariadne needs a mechanism to enable each node to share a 
secret key (i.e., KSD between source and destination). A TESLA key for 
each node in the network must be securely set up for each node in the 
network. 
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4.1.2.1 TESLA broadcast authentication protocol 
As mentioned above and discussed in [26], Ariadne uses the TESLA for 
authenticating routing packets. It is efficient in that it attaches just the 
Message Authentication Code (MAC) to a routing packet in order to 
achieve the broadcast authentication. A MAC can provide point-to-point 
authentication between two nodes using the same shared key. However, 
the receiving mobile nodes require the MAC key to authenticate the 
message for broadcasting communication. This is a vulnerability that 
may allow any receiving node to forge packets and impersonate the 
sender. TESLA solves this issue by relying on the time synchronization 
and delayed key detection. 
In order to utilize TESLA, all sending nodes generate a unidirectional 
key chain by choosing an initial TESLA key KN and repeatedly applying 
a unidirectional hash function H on this initial value. The equation is “Ki 
= H[Ki+1] = H
N-i
[KN]”  [7] 2005, p.23). The mobile node request the 
equation to the arriving value to verify the total is equal to the previous 
received key. This will authenticate all received values on the one way 
chain. For example, in order to authenticate Ki, we use the equation “Kj 
= H
i-j
[Ki]” [7] 2005, p.23)  to compute the value of Kj. If this value 
matches the previously received value of Kj, then Ki is authenticated. 
Each sending node decides a schedule to detect all keys of its 
unidirectional key chain, in sequentially K0, K1,..., KN. An easy and 
basic key detection schedule is the time at which K0 is detected, and the 
time t is the key detection interval. TESLA based on a receiving mobile 
node to check which keys a sending mobile node might have already 
detected. To do this, a receiving node calculates the time 
synchronization among nodes. For example, allow D be the highest 
difference between two mobile nodes; D value have to be known by 
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every node. For sending a packet, the sender mobile node chooses a key 
Ki from its own unidirectional key chain, uses the key to make a MAC 
value. This MAC value is attached to the packet. On receiving a packet 
authenticated with TESLA, the receiving node checks if the Ki has been 
disclosed by verifying tr  <= (T0 + i*t −D) – which is called TESLA 
condition. If this inequality is true, the Ki has not been detected – if not 
the key might have already detected and the attacker might have the 
packet been faked. 
The authors in [7] (2005, p.23) explain that if this verification is fully 
successful, the receiving mobile node will save the packet. Moreover, it 
stays for the sender mobile node to distribute key Ki. When the receiver 
mobile node has the Ki, it first authenticates Ki by applying the equation 
“Kj = H
i-j
[Ki]” [7] (2005, p.23). After that, it authenticates the saved 
packets and it is authenticated with a key Kj, where j <= i. 
 
Route Discovery 
In Ariadne, the basic RREQ message contains eight fields [6] (as shown 
below). Their functions are to provide: (a) authentication and (b) 
integrity to the routing protocol.  
The authors in [6] (2002: p.28) show that the mobile node verify its local 
table for source mobile node address and the identifier values as the 
mobile node received RREQ that is not the destination. If it received the 
same RREQ before, the node will reject it. That stage works in the same 
way as DSR protocol works. In addition, the mobile node verifies the 
time period in the RREQ. Its validity depends on these terms: (a) time 
period not be so large, and (b) the key identical to it has not been 
detected. Otherwise, the mobile node will reject the packet. If the packet 
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met the TESLA conditions, (a) the mobile node will change the RREQ 
by attaching its address in the mobile node request’s list ,(b) it will 
exchange the hash chain with “H [A, hash chain]” [6] 2002: p.28), and 
(c) attach the MAC of the complete RREQ to MAC’s list. The mobile 
node needs the TESLA key to calculate the MAC. At the end, the mobile 
node will retransmit the changed RREQ. 
As the destination mobile node has the RREQ, it will verify the TESLA 
condition, which equal to: 
“H [hn, H [hn-1 , H [ . . . , H [h1 , MACKsd (initiator, target, id, time 
interval) ]..]]]”,  [6] (2002: p.28). If the destination mobile node defines 
the RREQ packet is valid, it backwards a RREP packet to the source 
mobile node. 
 
Route Maintenance 
TESLA handles the authentication of RERR messages in a way similar 
to how the RREQ messages are handled [7].  These are briefly explained 
here with reference to [7]. To avoid the insertion of wrong route errors 
(RERRs) at the wireless network from any mobile node that have not 
seen the broken link, every mobile node going back on the same route to 
the source mobile node just transmit the RERR packet.  This leads to a 
delay in TESLA authentication. So every node on the returning route 
saves the error without sending it awaiting it is authenticated. Finally, 
the mobile node that saw the broken link detects the key and transmits it 
back to the same route, which will allow mobile nodes on that route to 
validate the saved error packets 
Ariadne is secure against the wormhole attacks just in its advanced 
edition that uses the TIK (TESLA with Instant Key disclosure) protocol 
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[25].  The authors in [25] (2003, p.4-5) show how the TIK protocol lets 
for extremely accurate time synchronization among the mobile nodes of 
the wireless network. It can also disclose any exception in the routing 
traffic flows in the wireless network. 
 
4.2 Summary 
In this chapter, two secured routing protocols for MANETs have been 
briefly presented. Their applications in some examples have also been 
explained. 
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CHAPTER 5: ELLIPTIC CURVE 
CRYPTOGRAPGHY IN DSR ROUTING 
PROTOCOL 
 
This chapter discusses Elliptic Curve Cryptography in DSR Routing 
Protocol. The first two sections describe the Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
by drawing on the works of [5-7, 36, 40, 67-85] . In the third section, Its 
present and analyze the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange [69, 74]. The 
fourth section focuses on the Elliptic Curve Cryptography Diffie-
Hellman Key Exchange. Its then move on to describe the ECDH 
Experiment in MANET [2, 86-88]  and discuss simulation results on 
self-created scenarios using performance metrics. In the fifth section it 
presents the security handshake attacks. The chapter ends with a short 
summary. 
 
5.1 Introduction  
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is defined as a process of the public 
key mechanism which depends on the algebraic formation of elliptic 
curve over a finite field [5] Figure 5.1. The technique of elliptic curve, 
based on cryptography, was proposed only by N. Koblitz and V. Miller 
in the year 1985.  According to Kumar and Anil (2011, p. 544), “public-
key cryptography is based on the intractability of certain mathematical 
problems”. In the beginning public keys are secure considering the 
difficulty to the large real number consisting of two or more large prime 
factors. “For elliptic-curve-based protocols, it is widely assumed that 
finding the discrete logarithm of a random elliptic curve element with 
respect to a publicly-known base point is infeasible” [80] 1986, p.418).  
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The Elliptic Curve size defines the difficulty of the problem. The main 
advantage of Elliptic Curve Cryptography is a smaller key size. This 
leads to a reduction in memory and communication demands that an 
ECC group could offer the same level of security as an RSA technique 
afforded based on a big modulus and identically larger key. For 
example, 256 bit key size in ECC should give as same security as 3072 
bit key size in RSA as shown in table 5.1 [83]. For modern cryptography 
objectives, an elliptic curve is a standard curve which contains the points 
which meet the equation proposed by [80]. 
             
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: A catalogue of elliptic curves. 
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Symmetric Algorithm 
(bits) 
RSA and DH 
(bits) 
ECC  
(bits) 
56 512 112 
80 1024 160 
112 2048 224 
128 3072 256 
192 7680 384 
256 15360 521 
     Table 5.1: Keys sizes comparison with RSA, DH and ECC  
 
ECC has been verified as lightweight computationally, comparable to 
RSA. Elliptic Curve Cryptographic mechanism can offer the same 
standard of security as other cryptosystems such as RSA which provide 
signatures by using Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) [76], key 
establishment by using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and 
asymmetric encryption by using Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption 
Scheme (ECIES) [78]. 
 
5.2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)  
Researchers like [84] have looked at the implementation of the Elliptic 
Curve cryptography (ECC) for Mobile Ad Hoc Network.  
The benefits offered by ECC [36, 82, 84] such as size and efficiency, 
have made it the cryptographic option for wireless networks and network 
devices. The elliptic curve cryptography system (ECCS) is a 
cryptography process of using a discrete logarithm problem (DLP) 
through the points on the elliptic curve [67]. ECC is generally defined 
over two finite fields: the main finite field Fp containing p factors and 
the special finite field containing 2
m
 factors. Cryptographic schemes are 
based on ECC which rely on scalar multiplication of elliptic curve 
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points, as explained in [71]. Given a real number k and a point P ε E(Fp), 
the scalar multiplication simply is the method of adding point P to itself 
k times. As an outcome of this scalar multiplication is stand for k times P 
or (k*P). [69] shows how the scalar multiplication for the elliptic curve 
numbers can be calculated professionally by using the addition base 
together with the double and add algorithm or only one of it differs. 
The great numbers of public key cryptography such as RSA or DH 
utilize even real number or polynomial mathematical with huge numbers 
or polynomials. This poses a major problem: it will force a considerable 
load in storing and processing for the keys and also for the messages.  
This will, in turn, result in lower speed and consumption of more 
bandwidth. Indeed, another solution is to apply an elliptic curve which 
offers two important aspects: the same security and smaller key sizes. 
An ECC is defined as an equation with two factors x and y, with 
coefficients [70]. In view of the cubic elliptic curve in the form of y
2
 = x
3
 
+ ax + b, as x, y, a, and b are all integers.  
The elliptic curve over integers is also problematic [68]. It can affect: (a) 
speed – the calculations can be slow; (b) accuracy – inaccurate results 
can be obtained due to rounding error and also unlimited fields. As a 
result, cryptography mechanisms need to be rapid and accurate 
arithmetically. In the cryptography mechanisms  proposed by [73], 
elliptic curves cryptography applies curves whose factors and 
coefficients are limited over two finite fields.   There are two families 
commonly used, as explained by [75]: 
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 prime curves Ep(a,b) defined over Zp  
This type uses real numbers modulo as a prime.  It is best to use in 
application softwares, which does not require extending bit-fiddling 
processes required by the binary curves.  
 binary curves E2
m
(a,b) defined over GF(2
n
) 
This type uses polynomials and binary coefficients.  It is best to use 
in hardware, which can get fewer logic gates to generate a 
cryptography system in contrast with prime curves. 
 
5.2.1 Secure Routing Comparisons 
A number of secure routings have been proposed. For example, [72] 
proposed on demand routing protocol ARAN  for MANET environment 
which utilize certificates to guarantee the authentication, the integrity 
and the non-repudiation of routing protocol messages. This protocol uses 
public key cryptography to overwhelm the attacks and ensures secured 
routing for the managed-open and open ad hoc networking 
environments.  
A secured routing protocol, SRP, was proposed by Papadimitratos and 
Haas [81]. It ensures secured communication in the open, collaborative 
and highly dynamic ad hoc networking environment. SRP respond to 
malicious behaviour in a timely manner and ensures comprehensive 
secure communication. Ariadne [6] prevents a wide range of attacks to 
ensure secure routing in an ad hoc networking environment. This 
protocol uses highly efficient symmetric cryptography that makes it 
more proficient and prohibits attackers from tampering with 
uncompromised routes. The problem with this protocol is that it does not 
safeguard against passive attackers. 
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Zhou and  Haas [89] have used effective key management to ensure 
secured routing over ad hoc networking environment. [79] have used 
misbehaviour detection schemes to secure ad hoc networks. The problem 
with this scheme is that it does not guarantee to have two main security 
parameters viz. integrity and authentication of routing packets. Johnson 
et al. (2002) proposed to use symmetric cryptography for secured 
routing over ad hoc networking environments. This can be implemented 
using one way hash chains. Zapata and Asokan [85] proposed a secured 
routing protocol that can make the use of asymmetric cryptography to 
authenticate participating  mobile nodes and also uses one way hash 
chains to ensure secured routing over wireless ad hoc environment. 
 
5.2.1.1 ARIADNE 
Ariadne, proposed by [7] and discussed in Chapter 4,  is based on DSR 
routing protocol and relies only on TESLA which is a kind of Symmetric 
Cryptography. TESLA is a proficient authentication that requires wide 
time synchronization. It works in the following way: first, it checks route 
authenticity and then it checks that no nodes are missing on RREQ 
message. It is vulnerable to any attacker during the route discovery 
process.  
 
5.3 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
 
The sender and receiver Diffie-Hellman algorithms were proposed by 
Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [74]. The Diffie-Hellman algorithm, as 
described in Chapter 3, relies on the complexity of calculating the 
discrete logarithms. It presumes that all users who participate in the 
network  define the prime number p and a primitive root g of p that 
necessary (g < p).  Below is an example of Diffie-Hellman exchanges 
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protocol [90] 1998, p.1): Alice and Bob are to exchange some 
information to each other by applying a public key cryptography 
technique: 
1. The users in public select a cyclic group G and a creator x of G. 
2. The two users Alice and Bob can select private keys a and b, as a 
and b are arbitrary real numbers. 
3. Now user Alice calculates xa, and also user Bob calculates xb, then 
they will exchange x
a
 and x
b
 values through an insecure network. 
4. While receiving these values between them, both users Alice and 
Bob calculate the value xab by applying their keys and indeed is 
x
ab
 = (x
a
)
b
 = (x
b
)
a  
values are equals.   
An eavesdropper (Chapter 2) who intercepts the message will have to 
get the value x
ab
 from x, x
a
, and x
b
 to be able to decrypt it. This is called 
the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). 
There are advantages to using ECDH key exchange in Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks. These include:  perfect flexibility to node capture, excellent 
scalability, low memory and bandwidth, and low communication 
overhead. 
  
5.4 ECC Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
As described in Section 5.2, ECC requests are extremely smaller than 
traditional public key cryptography systems, however maintaining an 
equivalent level of security is a main concern. The use of Elliptic curve 
permits faster encryption and decryption. The key exchange among users 
A and B by applying elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) can be 
accomplished as follows [84] (2006, p.2244), as shown in figure 5.2: 
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1- User A choose a real number which is A’s private key nA which is 
less than p. Then user A produces a public key from this equation:  
PA = nA * G;          (public key is a point in Ep(a, b)).  
2- User B will do the same by selecting a private key nB and calculate 
the public key from the equation:  
PB = nB * G.  
3- User A executes a scalar multiplication to achieve the shared 
secret key from this calculation:   
K = nA * PB.  
4- User B also execute a scalar multiplication to achieve the shared 
secret key from this calculation:   
         K = nB * PA. 
 
[84] (2006, p.2244) show how the two calculations in steps 3 and step 4 
generate the same outcome that because  
nA*PB = nA* (nB * G) = nB * (nA * G) = nB * PA. 
 
Both parties obtained equals values for K as E( p) is a commutative 
group. Every single run of the ECDH protocol needs both user A and 
user B to transmit two messages (exchanging the ephemeral public keys) 
and to execute overall of four scalar multiplications. The two parties 
could compute the first two scalar multiplications at the same time and 
the other two thereafter. “It is also possible to recalculate a pair of 
ephemeral keys when the parties are idling to speed up subsequent 
protocol runs” [91] 2009, p.118). Indeed, the secret key K is a point in 
the ECC. An eavesdropper knows only nA and nB but is not able to 
compute the secret from that. Since the two users A and B public keys 
are probably not to be changed over network lifetime and could be used 
again for key exchange with different communications partners, it is 
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possible to recompute them offline before sensor deployment.  This is 
illustrated below. The drawback of using ECDH is the intensive 
computation from the cryptographic processes which will affect the 
energy consumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: ECC diffie-hellman key exchange 
 
5.5 ECDH Experiment in MANET 
5.5.1 Goals 
One of the main goals is to determine the effects in the Performance 
analysis of ECDH extension on the performance metrics which is 
described in 5.5.3. In the experiments the normal DSR routing protocol 
has been used as a reference. Our goal is also to compare the ECDH 
with other existing secure routing protocol to illustrate the difference 
between them. Instead of simulating ECDH protocol in two different 
experiments one with DSR and one with Ariadne we have joined them in 
one experiment to achieve good results. The results indicate that ECDH 
routing protocol performs better than Ariadne and DSR routing 
protocols. This is because the proposed scheme contains memory 
effectiveness and powerful security advantages with less complication. 
Key pair generation  
Choose a private key   
      nA∈ [1, n-1] 
Compute public key  
           PA=nA .G 
Key pair generation 
Choose a private key 
       nB ∈  [1, n-1] 
Compute public key 
         PB=nB . G 
User A  User B 
nA 
nB 
Shared key computation 
K= nAQB 
Shared key computation 
K= nBQA 
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5.5.2 Simulation Setup 
Various performance metrics have been used in different network 
scenarios providing the modifications in DSR, ECDH and Ariadne 
routing protocols. In all scenarios DSR routing protocol is used as a 
reference. Indeed, Ariadne has been compared to distinguish the 
difference of security that has been used in ECDH routing protocol in 
MANET.  
In the second section of the experiment, we introduced the misbehaving 
mobile nodes in the network which do not forward packets to the other 
mobile nodes. 
 
The simulator has been implemented on Network Simulator 2 
(NS2.34)[92], a simulator for MANET. The experiments in this chapter 
were run 9 times. In addition, the confidence level of the intervals is 
95.70%  
 
5.5.3 Parameters 
The set of parameters for the simulations are shown in the Table 5.2.    
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Parameter Value 
Area  670m x 670m, 1500m x 300m 
Speed 1 to 10 m/s, 0 to 5 m/s 
Radio Range  250 m 
Movement  Random waypoint model  
MAC 802.11 
Application  UDP, CBR 
Packet Size  512 Bytes 
Simulation Time  500s, 600s  
Number of Nodes  10, 20, 50 nodes  
Pause Time  100 s 
Simulation runs 7, 9 times 
Table 5.2: Parameters 
 
5.5.4 Metrics 
RFC 2501 illustrates the amount of quantitative and qualitative 
performance metrics that can be applied to analyze the performance of 
MANET routing protocols as well as the secure routing [2]. Metrics that 
have been used to analyze the performance of proposed on-demand 
routing protocol (DSR), the proposed secure routing (ECDH), and an 
existing secure routing protocol (Ariadne)  are the packet delivery 
fraction (PDF), average end to end delay, network throughput and 
normalized routing load.  In the sections below, PDF has been used as 
quantitative metrics for pattern analysis and performance evaluation as 
mentioned in the secure routing protocols. This metric determines the 
completeness and correctness of the secure routing protocol, as 
discussed by [86]. 
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5.5.4.1 Packet Delivery Fraction (PDF) 
[88]  describe the ratio of number of the packets received (DPR) at the 
destinations over the number of the packets sent (DPS) by the sources as 
shown below. 
PDF = Total DPR / Total DPS X 100 
  
5.5.4.2 Average End-to-End Delay (Delay) 
It measures the average time  engaged in delivery of the packets from 
source to destination [88]. This can be computed by adding each delay 
for each succeeded packet delivery and after that, dividing the total by 
the number of succeeded received packets, as shown below. 
Delay = ∑ (Time Received – Time Sent)/Total Packets Received 
 
5.5.4.3 Network Throughput 
“A network throughput is the average rate at which message is 
successfully delivered between a destination node (receiver) and source 
node (sender)” [88], p.35). It is also referred to as a ratio of the number 
of data received from its sender to the time the last packet reaches its 
destination. The unit of measurement of Throughput is bits per second 
(bps).  A high level of throughput is a requirement in any network; it is 
required that the throughput is at high-level. There are some factors that 
affect the throughput for instance, topology changes, energy limitation, 
bandwidth limitation and unreliable communication. 
 
 Throughput Vs Goodput: 
Goodput has been used as one of the performance metrics which is the 
total number of correct and uncorrupted packets delivered to destination. 
In contrast to Throughput, loss and retransmission packet has been 
considered. Packet loss, which can be happen because of link errors, 
unreachable mobile nodes or the intermediate mobile nodes drops them, 
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can affect the Goodput. Thus, we use the total number of dropped 
packets in the network as a performance metric.      
  
5.5.4.4 Normalized Routing Load 
“The normalized routing load is determined as the ratio of all routing 
control packets sent by all nodes in the network over the number of 
received data packets at the destination nodes” [88]2012, p.35). 
Alternatively, it is the overall numbers of routing packets sent divided by 
the overall number of data packets received, as shown below.  
 
Normalized Routing Load = Total Routing Packets Sent/Total Data 
Packets Received 
 
5.5.5 Performance Metrics 
In the sections below, it presents and analyses different simulation 
results using performance metrics. We have evaluated the performance 
by selecting several network scenarios.  
 
5.5.5.1 Analysis using Performance Metrics 
The random waypoint model has been used as a mobility model [87]. A 
wide simulation model including the scenario of 10, 20 and 50 mobile 
nodes has been used to measure the performance for DSR, ECDH and 
Ariadne. We simulated by using NS 2.34 simulator tools. And the packet 
size is 512 bytes. The equal scenario has been used for all protocols to 
match the results. Both ECDH and Ariadne protocols share the same on-
demand behaviour, (which is based on DSR routing protocol). The 
difference between both protocol techniques can point to a considerable 
gap in performance. This is analyzed using packet delivery fraction in 
consideration of speed and pause time changing. The performance 
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results that look close to the existing ones give better security than the 
others.        
 
5.5.6 Simulations Results  
5.5.6.1 10 mobile nodes having 6 UDP links 
Area considered is 670 × 670 and the simulation running time is 500 
seconds over pattern analysis of 10 mobile nodes by using both UDP and 
TCP links with consideration to varying speed and pause time. Figure 
5.3 shows the packet deliveries Fraction based on the parameter of 
speed. The performance has been assessed for all protocols: DSR, 
ECDH and Ariadne by using 10 mobile nodes and 6 UDP links. In 
addition, the speed starts from 1 (m/s) to 10 (m/s). The packet delivery 
fraction PDF rates, calculated by using the received and the dropped 
packets, and the result rates are from 99.29% to 99.71%. The outcome 
shows that DSR in all t only at one point of time, as the same time 
ECDH and Ariadne give same PDF rates. In another way, DSR protocol 
performs better than ECDH and Ariadne protocols in “low mobility” 
case. 
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Figure 5.3: 10 mobile nodes with 6 UDP links 
 
In Figure 5.4, the PDF has been assessed for all protocols: DSR, ECDH 
and Ariadne based on the parameter of pause time without changing the 
number of mobile nodes also UDP links. In addition, the pause time 
starts from 100s to 500s. The PDF rates were calculated by using 
received and dropped packets. The result rates were from 99.31% to 
99.94%. In this simulation scenario, the perception here is that DSR 
gives fewer PDF rates than ECDH and Ariadne protocol when pause 
time ranges from 100s to 300s. However, ECDH and Ariadne protocols 
give approximately same PDR values, DSR and ECDH perform better 
than Ariadne when pause time is between 300 and 500s and Ariadne 
does better than DSR and ECDH when pause time is more than 500s. 
This enhanced the performance results that ECDH routing protocol 
launch between the destination mobile node which is receiving a 
ROUTE REQUEST and sending a ROUTE REPLY. 
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Figure 5.4: 10 mobile nodes with 6 UDP links 
 
 
5.5.6.2 10 mobile nodes having 6 TCP links 
Figure 5.5 shows the packet delivery fraction by using the parameter 
speed for all protocols: DSR, ECDH and Ariadne. The outcomes are 
based on 10 mobile nodes and 6 TCP links. In addition, the speed starts 
from 1 m/s to 10 m/s. The PDF rates are calculated by using received 
and dropped packets, and the results rates are from 97.61% to 98.12%. It 
shows that in “low mobility” case, Ariadne protocol gives just about the 
same PDF rates as ECDH protocol. That is because our ECDH protocol 
gives the same security power as Ariadne. DSR also gives lower PDF 
values. However, in “high mobility” case, Ariadne performs better than 
DSR and ECDH protocols.  
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Figure 5.5: 10 mobile nodes with 6 TCP links 
 
 
In Figure 5.6, the packet delivery fraction has been assessed using the 
parameter pause time based on 10 mobile nodes having 6 TCP links. In 
addition, the pause time begins from 100s to 500s. The PDF rates are 
calculated by using received and dropped packets. The results rates are 
from 96.41% to 98%. The perception here is that DSR gives low PDF 
and it increases when the pause time is increasing. However, Ariadne 
protocol better than DSR and ECDH as pause time is less but ECDH 
does better than DSR and Ariadne as the pause time is high as the ECDH 
trying to provide security as Ariadne. 
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Figure 5.6: 10 mobile nodes with 6 TCP links 
 
 
5.5.6.3 20 mobile nodes using 6 UDP links 
Area considered is 750 × 750 and simulation run time is 500s over 
pattern analysis of 20 mobile nodes by using UDP and TCP links both 
with consideration to varying speed and pause time. Figure 5.7 illustrates 
the packet delivery fraction depends on the parameter “speed”. This 
performance has been assessed for DSR, ECDH and Ariadne protocols 
by using 20 mobile nodes using 6 UDP links. In addition, the speed 
begins from 1 m/s to 10 m/s. The PDF rates are calculated by using 
received and dropped packets. The results rates are from 96.92% to 
98.74%. It shows that DSR in all speeds is steady. Indeed. At a single 
point of time, DSR, ECDH and Ariadne protocols give same PDF rates. 
Otherwise, ECDH protocol does better than DSR and Ariadne in “low 
mobility” case. This is because the number broken links were decreased 
for ECDH compared to Ariadne.  
In Figure 5.8, the PDF has been assessed for DSR, ECDH and Ariadne 
protocols depending on the parameter of pause time without changing 
the number of mobile nodes or UDP links. In addition, the pause time 
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begins from 100s to 500s. The PDF rates, calculated by using received 
and dropped packets, the results rates are from 95.09% to 98.94%. In 
this simulation scenario, the perception is DSR and ECDH protocols 
nearly give the equal PDF rates. Furthermore, DSR and ECDH perform 
better than Ariadne in all the cases. This is because that ECDH routing 
protocol is greatly efficient in discovering and maintaining routes 
between mobile nodes for delivering the data packets even with 
mobility.   
 
 
Figure 5.7: 20 mobile nodes with 6 UDP links 
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Figure 5.8: 20 mobile nodes with 6 UDP links 
 
 
5.5.6.4 20 mobile nodes having 6 TCP links 
Figure 5.9 presents the packet delivery fraction depending on the 
parameter speed for all protocols: DSR, ECDH and Ariadne. The 
outcomes are based on 20 mobile nodes and 6 TCP links. In addition, the 
speed starts from 1 m/s to 10 m/s. The PDF rates, calculated by using 
received and dropped packets, the outcomes are from 97.81% to 98.52%. 
It shows that in “low mobility” case, DSR protocol gives higher PDF 
rates than ECDH and Ariadne protocols in the beginning of the 
experiment. However, it gives lower rates than ECDH and Ariadne in 
just one point. Besides, ECDH and Ariadne protocols give roughly the 
same PDF rates as ECDH protocol in the beginning of the scenario, at 
the middle and at the end stage only. DSR and ECDH protocols 
approximately give equal results and also perform better than Ariadne. 
Otherwise, DSR does better than ECDH protocol in “high mobility” 
case. 
 In Figure 5.10, the PDF has been assessed based on the parameter pause 
time on 20 mobile nodes using 6 TCP links. Additionally, the pause time 
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starts from 100s to 500s. The PDF rates are calculated by using received 
and dropped packets. The outcomes rates are between 97.23% and 
98.34%. The perception is that the ECDH protocol performs better than 
DSR and Ariadne protocols as the pause time is low as the Route 
Discovery in ROUTE REPLY has a shorter time in ECDH routing 
protocol. Otherwise DSR does better than ECDH and Ariadne protocols 
as the pause time is high. 
 
 
Figure 5.9: 20 mobile nodes with 6 TCP links 
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Figure 5.10: 20 mobile nodes with 6 TCP links 
 
 
5.5.6.5 50 mobile nodes having 10 UDP links 
In this simulation scenario, area considered is 1000 × 1000 and run time 
is 700 seconds over pattern analysis of 50 mobile nodes using both UDP 
and TCP links with consideration to varying speed and pause time. 
Figure 5.11 illustrates the PDF by using the parameter “speed”. This 
performance has been assessed for all protocols: DSR, ECDH and 
Ariadne using 50 mobile nodes and 10 UDP links. In addition, the speed 
starts from 1 m/s to 10 m/s. The PDF rates are calculated by using 
received and dropped packets. The outcome rates are between 89.04% 
and 95.60%.  The DSR protocol performs better than ECDH and also 
ECDH protocol performs better than Ariadne protocol as route cashing 
in ECDH can further reduce Route Discovery time unlike Ariadne. In 
Figure 5.12, the PDF has been also assessed for DSR, ECDH and 
Ariadne protocols by using the parameter pause time without changing 
the number of mobile nodes and the UDP links. Additionally, the pause 
time begins from 100s to 650s. The PDF rates are calculated by using 
received and dropped packets. The results rates are from 88.95% to 
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95.26%. In this simulation scenario, the perception is the same as 
mentioned above: DSR does better than ECDH and ECDH does better 
than Ariadne. The decrease in Ariadne is because the losses of data 
packets during the communication due to broken links and the node 
mobility.    
 
 
Figure 5.11: 50 mobile nodes with 10 UDP links 
 
 
Figure 5.12: 50 mobile nodes with 10 UDP links 
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5.5.6.6 50 mobile nodes having 10 TCP links 
Figure 5.13 shows the PDF by using the parameter of speed for all 
protocols: DSR, ECDH and Ariadne. The outcomes are based on 50 
mobile nodes and 10 TCP links. Furthermore, the speed starts from 1 
m/s to 10 m/s. The PDF rates are calculated by using received and 
dropped packets. The outcomes are between 91.71% and 96.58%.  In 
“low mobility” case, ECDH approximately gives the same PDF rates as 
the Ariadne protocol. However, DSR protocol gives lower PDF values in 
same “low mobility”.  However, in “high mobility” case, ECDH does 
better than DSR and Ariadne protocols. In Figure 5.14, the PDF has 
been assessed by the parameter of pause time based on 50 mobile nodes 
having 10 TCP links. Furthermore, the pause time begins from 100s to 
650s. The PDF rates are calculated by using received and dropped 
packets. The results are between 92.70% and 97.04%. In this perception 
the DSR protocol does better than ECDH and Ariadne while ECDH 
performs better than Ariadne when the pause time is low. The three 
protocols give approximately the same PDF rates when pause time is 
high. Those routes in ECDH are maintained among mobile nodes in the 
network that need to communicate. This has decreased the overhead of 
route maintenance.   
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Figure 5.13: 50 mobile nodes with 10 TCP links 
 
 
Figure 5.14: 50 mobile nodes with 10 TCP links 
 
5.6 Security handshake attacks 
The following paragraphs describe two types of security handshake 
attacks: SYN flooding attack and session hijacking. As explained and 
illustrated in the figures below, these two kinds of attack differ in the 
way in which they are carried out. 
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1. SYN ﬂooding attack: This is a kind of attack that allows many 
halves to open TCP connections and keep them open without 
completing the handshake procedure, as shown in Figure 5.15. 
The attack takes place in the following manner. Firstly, mobile 
node A transmits a packet SYN to mobile node B which is the 
Synchronize, and sequence number = X. Secondly, node B sends a 
packet SYN, and ACK to node A which is synchronize 
acknowledge, sequence number = P, and acknowledge number = 
X+1. Finally, node A sends a packet ACK to node B which is 
acknowledge, sequence number equal to X+1, and acknowledge 
number equal to P+1. As a result of this procedure, the handshake 
is now completed.       
Figure 5.15: TCP handshake 
Through the SYN attacks, the malicious mobile node transmits a huge 
number of SYN packets to the target mobile node. This deceives the 
return SYN packets addresses. Then the SYN-ACK packets will send 
from the target mobile node after receiving the SYN packets from the 
       Node B           Node A 
SYN-ACK, 
Sequence Number 
P, Ack. Number 
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malicious mobile node. In next stage, the target mobile node remains for 
the reply of ACK packet. With no getting the ACK packets, the semi 
opened connection will remain for the acknowledgment of the 
handshake; all that will affect and overflow the buffer. This is illustrated 
in Figure 5.16 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 5.16: SYN attack 
 
2. Session Hijacking: it gets the benefit that the majority of the 
connections are secured (via giving the certificates) at the session 
establish, except the next stage. “The TCP session hijacking 
attacks, the attacker spoofs the victim’s IP address, determines the 
correct sequence number that is expected by the target, and then 
performs a DoS attack on the victim” [93] 2010, p.210) . 
Consequently, the attacker will pretend to be the victim and carry 
on the session with the destination node. This type of attack is 
illustrated in the figure 5.17 below. 
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Figure 5.17: Session hijacking attack 
 
5.6.1 Performance metrics 
In this section, it looks at the set-up for the experiments performed. We 
have simulated the experiment in NS-2. All mobile nodes in our 
simulation scenario moving depend on the Random Waypoint model; a 
mobile node begins at an arbitrary location, remains for the duration 
known as pause time, and then selects another location and goes there by 
the speed between 0 and 5 m/s. it has used a space size 1500m X 300m 
to raise the amount of hops in the routes. The average values of these 7 
simulation runs are then calculated for the two metrics in malicious 
environment. The three protocols: DSR, Ariadne and ECDH were run on 
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the same movements and the same communication scenarios, as shown 
in Table 5.2 and 5.3. It calculated three metrics for each simulations run: 
1. Packet Overhead: is number of routing packets broadcasts; for 
instance, a (RREP) transmitted through three hops will take it 
as three packets in this metric. 
2. Packet Delivery fraction: is total fraction of application level 
packet sent that was in fact received at the intended destination 
mobile node. 
3. Average Latency: is average time ended from when the packet 
is initially sent to when it is initially received at its destination. 
Number of nodes  50 nodes 
Speed  0 to 5 m/s 
Area  1500m X 300m  
Nodes connections  20 
Number of malicious nodes 10 nodes 
Packet size  512 bytes 
Initial RREQ timeout 2 seconds  
Maximum RREQ timeout  40 seconds  
Table 5.3 Scenarios Parameters  
5.6.2 Simulation Results 
In the sections below, it presents the simulation results for 10 malicious 
nodes. The figures below show the simulation result for each of the three 
metrics (packet overhead, packet delivery fraction and average latency) 
mentioned above. 
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5.6.2.1 10 malicious mobile nodes 
Figure 5.18 shows the overhead. ECDH protocol has constantly lower 
overhead than Ariadne protocol. This is achieved by decreasing the 
quantity of Route Error (RERR) packets that have been sent. In addition, 
because of TESLA the overhead is much lower than for the DSR and 
ECDH protocol. Figure 5.18 also illustrates that ECDH authentication 
gets much less overhead than Ariadne protocol. 
 
 
Figure 5.18: Overhead 
 
Figure 5.19 illustrates the packet delivery fraction (PDF) for all 
protocols. The data show that the delivery packet ratio in DSR and 
Ariadne is lower than ECDH at higher levels of mobility. This is due to 
the fact that Route Discovery in a Route Reply will have a shorter time.  
Of particular interest here is the result for ECDH. Surprisingly, ECDH 
actually outperforms Ariadne and DSR at lower and higher level of 
mobility. This enhanced the performance outcomes from the average 
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delay that ECDH introduces among the target when receiving the 
(RREQ) packet and sending the (RREP) packet. 
 
 
Figure 5.19 Packet Delivery Fractions 
 
Figure 5.20 shows the average latency for all protocols. In general 
average latency, ECDH protocol does better than Ariadne protocol. This 
is due to the decrease in the number of broken links for ECDH protocols 
(compared to the Ariadne protocol). However, DSR has a better average 
latency than both ECDH and Ariadne. The results show that after the 
packet forwarding is disabled by a number of malicious mobile nodes of 
the MANET, the overall network performance hardly deteriorates. To 
correct this, some kind of selfishness behavior has to take into 
consideration while designing a secure routing protocol.  
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Figure 5.20 Average Latency 
To summaries, EDCH, Ariadne and DSR differ in terms of their results 
for packet overhead, packet delivery ratio and average latency. The 
experiments show that DSR has the lowest packet overhead while 
Ariadne has the highest packet overhead. EDCH consistently has the 
highest packet delivery fraction. DSR shows the best results for average 
latency.  
5.7 Summary 
This chapter has focused on the comparative study and performance 
analysis of two important secure routing based on DSR routing protocol 
based on packet delivery fractions which it has been drawn in our 
research.  
A significant part of this chapter has been devoted to the analysis of data 
from selective several network scenarios. The outcomes have been 
presented in figures. It has been shown that ECDH protocol is better in 
performance compared with DSR and Ariadne protocols in a normal 
network environment. However, ECDH protocol provides better security 
as it achieves better in malicious environment. Nevertheless, in 
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handshake attacks ECDH protocol shows better results that in DSR and 
Ariadne protocols.  
In the future MANET’s denser mediums will be used with increasing 
applications.   It can therefore be said that in terms of packet delivery, 
ECDH is a better choice for routing in the malicious environment. It 
should be noted that the research presented in Section 5.5 is ongoing as 
some aspects of the research are still being investigated. Further research 
will consider the performance of other metrics like delay, throughput, 
and node lifetime in wireless network environments. 
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CHAPTER 6: TRUST ROUTING IN MANET FOR 
SECURING ECDH PROTOCOL 
 
This chapter describes a new authentication service and trust level 
attached in every packet to make the routing in Mobile Ad-Hoc Network 
secure. Efficient procedure of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks depends on 
suitable maintenance of routing information in a distributed network. 
Since the routing protocol is vulnerable from malicious mobile nodes 
attacks, our prime focus is on securing them. This has been achieved 
through the introduction of the security method for routing protocols in 
MANET. Our scheme which assists to achieve the authentication with 
minimum overheads has been developed to work better with DSR 
routing protocol. Not only does it prevent attacks from external intruders 
but it also detects misbehaviours of the wireless network nodes at the 
same time. The combination of the scheme in the routing protocol has 
guaranteed that the performance is not altered considerably. 
Section 6.1 below describes trust in ad-hoc networks. The next section 
analyses trust in routing protocols focusing specifically on security 
aware protocols and trust-aware routing protocols. Section 6.3 examines 
trust computation in routing. Section 6.4 looks at a new method of 
security using trust table multi path routine. The final part of this chapter 
consists of a short conclusion.  
6.1 Trust in Ad-hoc Network  
Trust, is a featured and important part in any network environment, 
is defined in terms of the confident reliance of one entity on the other 
[94]. Trust management deals with: (a) the establishment of 
justification for placing trust; and (b) the modification of 
90 
 
dependencies so as to mitigate the associated risks. Dynamic trust 
management is concerned with these issues under changing 
circumstances. Authentication is the important application of trust in 
network systems. Trust has the potential to solve further problems 
than the traditional cryptographic security. For example, Trust can 
help in deciding the quality of the nodes and the quality of their 
services, and provide the corresponding access control.  
In [85, 95] the authors have proposed security systems to secure 
MANET. These systems use digital signatures or one way hash 
algorithms but totally ignoring the trust relationships models among 
mobile nodes in MANET. While these systems can afford more 
secure solutions to routing, they actually decrease the effectiveness 
of routing discovery. The reduction in efficiency is due to the 
significant time and performance consuming procedure of the 
complex computation in each operation [96, 97]. 
 
6.2 Trusts in routing protocols 
6.2.1 Security aware routing (SAR) 
Security aware routing (SAR) presents a system that combines the 
security levels into the routing techniques. SAR protocol classifies 
mobile nodes and clearly describes the trust values for every 
classification.   According to [98], ““quality of protection” and “security 
attributes” to the route metrics have to be clarified. Specification is 
essential as some applications need not just the shortest routes but as 
well secure ones”. The SAR protocol depends on every on demand ad 
hoc routing protocols such as DSR and AODV. The SAR protocol has 
two major objectives: (a) discovery for the routes which include security 
levels and (b) protection of information passing through so that security 
levels cannot be modified.  SAR attempts to use classical symmetric key 
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so as to offer a higher level of security in MANET. Although the use of 
SAR presents with a higher level of security in MANET, attacks are still 
possible. [99] (2007, p.8) describes some of the drawbacks in using 
SAR, e.g.: 
1. Some nodes misbehave provided that they have the exact key.  
2. If a malicious node somehow restores the exact key, the protocol will 
remain open for all attacks. 
3. High power consumption because the encryption and the decryption 
are used at every hop. 
 
6.2.2Trust-aware Routing Protocol (TARP) 
[100] proposed TARP protocol for determinable for securing the route 
discovery and diffusion of the trust levels and security attributes as 
metrics. TARP is performed over Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) 
protocol. Trust-Aware Routing Protocol “TARP” [100] 2006, p.135) is 
one of the mechanisms which focus on some factors on security mobile 
ad hoc network trusted availability and quality of trust, unlike other 
mechanisms which focus on the shortest path.  
TARP has been evaluated on two important attributes: (a) the battery 
power and (b) the software configuration. However, the other 
parameters, i.e., hardware configuration, credit history, exposure, and 
organization hierarchy, which may affect the trust metric, have not been 
evaluated.  
TARP mechanism has 6 steps to create a trust route between source and 
destination node.  Firstly, the source will send N_Request to the 
neighbors when the source has data to send; asking for Attribute Number 
(ANs). The neighbors will send N_Replay including AN to the source; 
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this step is called “One Hop Check”. Secondly, the source will check 
ANs up to confirm whether they are matching or not. This is done by 
sending FN_Request to neighbors in different paths asking for Trust 
Numbers (TNs). The neighbors will replay by sending FN_Replay 
including TN. Thirdly; the third and the fourth steps are on demand 
route discovery. Finally, the fifth and the sixth steps are TARP localized 
route maintenance.  
However, the second step is not a dynamic solution to the trust problem 
[101]. Indeed, for instance, if the source mobile node request is above 
60% Trust Number (TN) for the credit history, power and RAM, in 
addition to a neighbour mobile node claimed 90% TN for credit history, 
95% for power and 58% RAM, that mobile node will truly not be trusted 
as the neighbour mobile node requesting above 90% for credit history 
and 95% for power. It can be assumed that there is a failing in the TARP 
work which is the neighbour node. It has to use the same encryption 
algorithm as the source node, otherwise the packet will be dropped  
[102]. 
6.3 Trust Calculation in Routing 
When we assess the experience of a trust value [103], it is essential to 
measure the amount of out coming packets genuinely sent by the 
neighbouring mobile node [103]. To understand this, we have to monitor 
any mobile node that participates in the packet forwarding. Monitoring 
can be achieved by putting every mobile node in the promiscuous 
procedure for the all time even the mobile node sending control or data 
packets. Upon discovering that its instant neighbour mobile nodes are 
transmitting the packet, the mobile node verifies packet integrity. This is 
done to guarantee the packet has not been changed by another malicious 
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mobile node. If it detects that the neighbour mobile node has succeeded 
the integrity check, the outcome packet counter of this neighbour mobile 
node have to be increased. However, failure in succeeding the integrity 
check or in cooperating to forward the packets it is assumed to, results in 
its equivalent forwarding counter not to be changed. After some time, 
the value of experience will be very low on consideration of malicious 
behaviour.  
 Investigation of trust value knowledge uses the link layer 
acknowledgements that implicate the MAC protocol which gives 
feedback of the succeeded transmission delivery for data packets. That 
will enable the MAC layer to perform an easy calculation. A number of 
mobile nodes in MANET cannot obtain the experience and knowledge 
of trust vector directly, except through   recommendation from others. 
That restriction is due to the transmission range of MANET which is 
usually about 100 or 200 meters. In fact, we require the trust value to be 
easy to broadcast among mobile nodes in the network - avoiding 
annoying overhead in the assessment in recommendations of the trust 
value.  
It proposed an appropriate system that depends on route discovery 
procedure by expanding the trust values of mobile nodes over the Route 
Request packets. In fact, trust values are evaluated based on direct 
experience among the mobile nodes. The mobile node before 
transmitting the RREQ packet to the neighbours has to insert its trust 
value regarding the one hop neighbour mobile nodes and then 
broadcasted to them. Therefore, the RREQ packet will distribute the 
trust values. For instance, mobile node S sends a RREQ packet to mobile 
nodes A, B, and C. The mobile node A will attach its trust value about 
mobile node E to the RREQ packet and then broadcast it. Mobile node B 
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will also attach its trust value about mobile node F to the RREQ and so 
on. Then the source mobile node will select the high trust values in the 
route, any low trust value in any route will be dropped. 
The essential problem with some of routing protocols that been used to 
trust all mobile nodes and assume that they all behave well. However 
some of those mobile nodes which been trusted may be not behaving 
well. “Most ad hoc network routing protocols become inefficient and 
show dropped performance while dealing with large number of 
misbehaving nodes” [104] 2010, p.12). 
6.4 Trust Route in DSR  
We proposed a new technique of security using trust table multi path 
routing such as “trust-aware routing framework for wireless sensor 
networks” (TARF)[105]. This mechanism makes it hard for malicious 
mobile nodes to have access to the data packet. If they do, they will 
be dropped. We are avoiding non trustable routes that might bring 
force attacks. They might decrypt packets if they get access to 
sufficient sections of these messages.  
[106] recommended the use of cryptographic mechanisms. This kind 
of techniques includes several complex encryption/decryption 
algorithms. Other mechanisms of trust have been proposed in the 
literature. For example, [107] tried to establish a trust management 
by using the concept of weight.  
Our working assumption is that every mobile node makes a trust table 
and saves the all the trust values for its one hop mobile nodes. The trust 
value is set between 0 and 1. And we can assign for well behaved 
(normal) mobile node a trust value >= 0.5, whereas the malicious mobile 
node trust value can be marked < 0.5 as shown an examples of normal 
95 
 
and malicious behavior  in table 6.4. In our model, we do not consider 
the path trust value calculation that will reduce the overhead and also the 
delay. Once the DSR chooses the shortest route among the source and 
the destination, it will look to the lowest trust and destination. It will 
look to the lowest trust value in the path if its value is less than 0.5 
(<0.5). This means in that path there is a malicious node. We will then 
go for the next path from the DSR cache as seen in Table 6.1. Figure 6.1 
and Table 6.2 show an example for this mechanism. Based on the 
behavior (table 6.4) of the mobile node in the network it can decrease or 
increase the trust values by 0.1 as described in this equation: 
For increment: New Trust Value = Old Trust Value + 0.1 
For decrement: New Trust Value = Old Trust Value – 0.1 
 
Trust value level Range  Action 
Low Trust Value 
(Malicious mobile Node) 
< 0.5 to 0 Not trusted 
High Trust Value (Trusted 
mobile Node) 
>= 0.5 to 1  Trusted 
Table 6.1: Trust value level 
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Figure 6.1: An example of the trust value mechanism 
 
Route Neighbor ID Trust Value Trust Level 
Route 1 A 0.7 High 
E 0.5 High 
Route 2 B 0.6 High 
F 0.4 Low 
H 0.9 High 
Route 3 C 0.3 Low 
G 0.8 High 
Table 6.2: Example of the trust value mechanism 
 
Our trust model differs from the other models proposed so far e.g., [106-
110] . Previous models make a calculation, which causes a delay and an 
overhead. Our algorithm is shown in Table 6.3 by adding Trust Value 
filed to the packet in the RREQ and RREP packets. 
 
 
S 
A 
B 
C 
F 
E 
G 
H D 
TV (S, A) = 0.7 TV (A, E) = 0.8 
TV (S, B) = 0.6 
TV (B, F) = 0.4 
TV (F, H) = 0.9 
TV (S, C) = 0.3 TV (C, G) = 0.8 
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DSR algorithm Trust DSR 
Source mobile node broadcast RREQ 
to its neighbor  
RREQ: [IPdestination,IPsource,Seqnum] 
Mobile node will judge on the 
next one hop neighbor and give 
a trust value on it 
U Trust Value 
Neighbor node mobile checks its 
routing cache for available route to 
destination.  
 
IF fresh route exit THEN reply with 
RREP to source node 
As in RREQ will include the 
neighbor list with their Trust 
Values 
ELSE, rebroadcast RREQ to the 
neighbor (add its IP address in the 
RREQ before rebroadcast) 
Before rebroadcast the 
intermediate node will judge on 
the next one hop neighbors and 
give a trust value 
Source node waits for more that 
RREP from the destination  
RREP:[IPsourse,IPdestination,Seqnum] 
 
 
U Trust Value 
Then, the source will choose the 
shortest route to the destination  
And also based on the trust 
value, IF, there is a low trust 
value in the path. THEN, 
eliminate that path and go to the 
next shortest path.   
Table 6.3: Trust DSR and DSR algorithm 
 
The first step for trusting the nodes is in the Route Discovery figures, as 
described above. Secondly, while sending the data to the target node, the 
trust value will increase or decrease based on trustworthiness evaluation. 
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For instance, CONFIDANT [111] , CORE “Collaborative Reputation 
Mechanism to enforce node cooperation in Mobile Ad hoc Networks” 
[112] and OCEAN [113] protocols check and evaluate the 
trustworthiness of the one hop mobile nodes and eliminate any distrust 
mobile  nodes from broadcasting packets. Examples of ways to increase 
or decrease the trust value are shown in Table 6.4 below. 
 
Increment (+.01) Decrement (-0.1) 
common leaving from the 
network 
Uncommon leaving from the 
network 
Standard joining Unusual joining 
Higher Power availability Lower power availability 
Higher bandwidth 
availability 
Lower bandwidth 
availability 
Table 6.4: Examples of ways to increase or decrease the trust value 
Our focus will be on direct trust relationship between two nodes. Most 
of the reputation systems rely on reputation values like a metric of trust. 
But these present with some drawbacks [114] (2007, p.6-9): 
1. Huge caching: Every mobile node maintains public reputation 
values; consequently saving this information requires a massive 
caching. 
2. Increase in volume of network traffic due to dissemination of 
reputation information. 
3. These reputations information might be modify, replied, forgery 
or lost by fraud mobile node transmission between the source 
and mobile nodes in the network.  
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4. Creation of additional problems upon assignment of an initial 
reputation value as a new mobile node accesses the wireless 
network or a mobile node goes to a different location, e.g., time 
needed at this point to trust the neighbor mobile nodes before 
they access the wireless network.  
5. Inconsistency in reputation due to the fact that in reputation 
systems, a mobile node might have two or more reputation 
values based on other mobile node reputation values.  
All the mobile nodes over the route of the packet will participate to learn 
and detect all kinds of changing behavior of the neighbors.  
The packet forwarding route of neighbors enables classification of trust 
metric. Forwarding average of the neighbors is checked and registered 
for each time, as shown below.  
                 
                           
                               
 
Route Request (RREQ) 
Option type Option data length Identification 
Target address 
Address [1] 
Address [2] 
…. 
Address [n] 
Neighbor List  
Trust Value 
Figure 6.2: Trust DSR data packet header format (RREQ)  
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Route Reply (RREP) 
 Option type Option data length L Reserved  
Address [1] 
Address [2] 
…. 
Address [n] 
Neighbor List  
Trust Value 
Figure 6.3: Trust DSR data packet header format (RREP) 
 
6.5 Trust Models in MANETS 
The general term “misbehavior” has sometimes been used to describe 
attacks in MANETs. Indeed, some researchers, for example [115, 116] , 
have not defined the specific selfish behavior in their mechanisms but 
have preferred the broad term “misbehavior” to define any kind of 
attack.  
There are different kinds of trust in MANET such as Reputation based 
model and credit based model. Examples of reputation based models are 
CONFIDANT[111], CORE[112], and OCEAN[113]. These kinds of 
mechanisms are based on DSR routing protocol without cryptographic 
authentication. The assumption in these models is that all mobile nodes 
in the network are not malicious. Reputations systems are based on the 
following two types: (1) mobile nodes monitoring other neighbors 
directly, and (2) other mobile nodes monitoring other neighbors.   
A model proposed by Liu et al. (2004) defined and maintained a 
dynamic trust relationship using trust value between mobile nodes. This 
is based on some important assumptions. These assumptions deploy 
processes and intrusion detection systems (IDS) that: (1) detect the 
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malicious mobile node, and (2) report that to other mobile nodes in the 
network. 
Another model proposed by Davis (2004) used a kind of trust 
management mechanism which depends on a structure hierarchical trust 
model. Every mobile node in the network must provide an active digital 
certificate to be trusted. Once this is achieved, it will sum up all 
weighted accusations. If the result is bigger than a predefined threshold, 
the mobile node will cancel the certificate which goes against MANET’s 
nature. 
Some trust models shared recommendations among mobile nodes to 
create a reputation database. However, these kinds of models faced some 
problems such as a large network overhead because of the reputation 
information exchanged among the mobile nodes and also addressing the 
possible for malicious recommendations needs to be trusted by trust 
third party or public key infrastructure.  
 
Figure 6.4: Trust Model and ECDH on DSR routing protocol 
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Our trust model, as mentioned in 6.3, will be built on ECDH routing 
protocol. This will provide better security against selfish mobile nodes in 
the MANETs. However, some mechanisms assume that all mobile nodes 
in the network are good while others support the trust values after the 
authentication has been made between the mobile nodes in the network. 
By adding the trust model to the ECDH, it will eliminate the routes that 
contain selfish nodes between the source and destination mobile nodes. 
In our experiments, the word “Malicious” is defined as a bad behavior 
performed by selfish (because of the bandwidth preservation or the 
power consumption) or erroneous mobile nodes. These nodes do not 
forward packets, drop packets, lead to hardware failures or incorrect 
software.   The section below describes our experiments. Section 6.8 
presents the results for these experiments in low malicious nodes and 
high malicious nodes. 
 
6.5.1 CONFIDDENCE 
Cooperation of Nodes, Fairness in Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTwork is a 
protocol which proposed by [111]. It is based on direct trust and indirect 
trust from other mobile nodes sharing behaviour information which is 
updated by Bayesian estimation.  
This technique contains four components: 1) the Monitor, 2) the 
Reputation System, 3) the Path Manger, and 4) Trust Manager. 
Moreover, these components are shown in every mobile node in the 
network as shown in Figure 6.5. 
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Figure 6.5: CONFIDANT architecture 
6.6 TV-ECDH Experiment in MANETs 
6.6.1 Goals 
Our goal is to evaluate out trust model in the lack of the security in the 
routing protocols, so as to understand its performance against the 
attacks. We have been focused on the performance in terms of packets 
delivery ratio, overhead, average latency and malicious mobile nodes 
detected in the network.   
 
6.6.2 Simulation Setup 
The metrics has been used in two network scenarios providing the 
modifications in DSR, TV-ECDH and CONFIDANT routing protocols. 
The first scenario contains a low number of malicious mobile nodes and 
in the second scenario contains a high number of malicious mobile 
nodes in the network. In all scenarios DSR routing protocol is used as a 
reference. Indeed, CONFIDANT has been evaluated to distinguish the 
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difference of security that has been used in TV-ECDH routing protocol 
in MANET.  
The simulator has been implemented on Network Simulator 2 
(NS2.34)[92], as it has been used in Chapter 5. The experiments in this 
chapter were run 6 times. In addition, the confidence level of the 
intervals is 93.40%. 
 
6.6.3 Parameters 
The set of parameters for the simulations are shown in the table 6.2.    
 
Parameter Value 
Area  900m x 900m 
Speed 5 m/s 
Radio Range  250 m 
Movement  Random waypoint model  
MAC 802.11 
Application  CBR 
Packet Size  512 Bytes 
Simulation Time  800s   
Number of Nodes  50 nodes  
Number of 
Malicious nodes 
5 nodes (10%), 25 nodes (50%)  
Pause Time  100 s 
Node Connections  20 
Simulation runs 6 times 
Table 6.5: Parameters 
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6.6.4 Performance Metrics   
We have simulated the experiment in NS-2. Each node in our simulation 
moves is based on Random Waypoint model and works in the following 
way:  the node starts at a random position; waits for duration called 
pause time, and then chooses a new random location and moves there 
with a speed 5 m/s. We have used a space size 900m X 900m to increase 
the number of hops in routes used relative to a square space. The average 
values of these 6 simulation runs are then calculated for the three levels 
of malicious environment. The aim of our experiment is to detect the 
malicious nodes and eliminate that route which contains a malicious 
mobile node. All protocols were run on identical movement and 
communication scenarios as presented in Table 6.5. We computed four 
metrics for each simulations run, as explained below: 
1. Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): the total fraction of application 
level data packet sent that was actually received at the intended 
destination node. 
2. Packet Overhead: the number of transmissions of routing packets; 
for instance, a ROUTE REPLY sent over three hops would count 
as three packets in this metric. 
3. Average Latency: the average time elapsed from when a data 
packet is first sent to when it is first received at its destination. 
4. Malicious mobile nodes detected in the MANET. 
6.7 Simulation Results 
6.7.1 Simulation results for 5 malicious nodes (low)   
Figure 6.6 shows the packet delivery ratio (PDR) for DSR, 
CONFIDANT and TV-ECDH. The delivery packet ratio in DSR is the 
lowest because no authentication got in the protocol. On the other hand, 
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the packet delivery ratio for CONFIDANT is slightly higher than those 
for TV-ECDH and DSR in low mobility. However, TV-ECDH has a 
better result in high mobility. That’s because the TV-ECDH routing 
protocol is effective in discovering and maintaining routes for delivering 
packets, even with high mobility.    
 
 
Figure 6.6: Packet Delivery Rate (PDR) (in Low malicious nodes) 
 
Figure 6.7 illustrates the packet overhead. As illustrated by the results, 
TV-ECDH always gets lower packet overhead during the pause time 
than CONFIDANT. TV-ECDH is close to DSR routing protocol in high 
and almost low mobility. The main cause for getting better performance 
in TV-ECDH routing protocol is the routing decisions based on trust 
evaluations. 
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Figure 6.7: Packet Overhead (in Low malicious nodes) 
 
Figure 6.8: Average Latency (in Low malicious nodes) 
 
Figure 6.8 illustrates the results for average latency in low malicious 
nodes. As shown, the average latency in low malicious mobile nodes in 
TV-ECDH and CONFIDANT are almost the same. It is to be noted that 
TV-ECDH slightly outperforms CONFIDANT in high mobility. 
However, in low mobility CONFIDANT outperforms TV-ECDH. TV-
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ECDH in high mobility is able to reduce the average latency by 
forwarding more packets in less time. 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Malicious mobile node detecting (in Low malicious nodes) 
 
Figure 6.9 presents the findings for the fourth metric tested: detection of 
malicious nodes. Figure 5.8 shows the percentage of detecting malicious 
mobile node for DSR, CONFIDANT and TV-ECDH in low malicious 
mobile nodes. The results show that TV-ECDH is a little faster to detect 
malicious nodes than both CONFIDANT and DSR.  DSR cannot detect 
malicious node properly but according to the ROUTE ERRORs the DSR 
eliminate that route which has the error from the source cache.    
In the next section of experiment, it presents the simulation results in 
high malicious nodes.  
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6.7.2 Simulation results for 25 malicious nodes (high)   
Figure 6.10 shows the PDR in high malicious node environment. This 
environment is understood as having 50% of mobile nodes in the 
network as malicious. As shown by the results, DSR got a lower PDR 
compared to CONFIDANT and TV-ECDH.  TV-ECDH has the best 
packet delivery ratio of all three. Indeed, TV-ECDH outperforms 
CONFIDANT and DSR in both low and high levels of mobility. 
CONFIDANT’s performance can be explained by the fact that it faced 
Bad Mouthing Attacks. These provide bad or wrong recommendation of 
other nodes.  
 
Figure 6.10: Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) (in High malicious node) 
 
Figure 6.11 shows the packet overhead in high malicious mobile nodes 
in MANET for DSR, CONFIDANT and TV-ECDH. In the beginning of 
the scenario DSR performs slightly better than both TV-ECDH and 
CONFIDANT. But after 200 seconds TV-ECDH outperforms both DSR 
and CONFIDANT. CONFIDANT consistently has the highest packet 
overhead in high malicious nodes.  
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Figure 6.11: Packet Overhead (in High malicious node) 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Average Latency (in High malicious nodes) 
 
Figure 6.12 shows the results for average latency in high malicious 
nodes. It can be observed that in terms of average latency, TV-ECDH 
outperforms CONFIDANT at all pause times and has the same average 
latency values as DSR in high mobility. However, DSR outperforms 
both TV-ECDH and CONFIDANT.   
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Figure 6.13: Malicious mobile node detecting (in High malicious nodes) 
 
Figure 6.13 shows the percentage of malicious mobile nodes detection 
with 50% malicious for DSR, CONFIDANT and TV-ECDH. DSR is the 
slowest to detect malicious mobile nodes. It should be noted that DSR 
did not detect all the malicious mobile nodes in the experiment. This can 
be compared to the performance of TV-ECDH and CONFIDANT. TV-
ECDH gives the best results in that it can detect malicious nodes faster 
than CONFIDANT.  However, by the end of the experiment, both TV-
ECDH and CONFIDANT had detected all the malicious mobile nodes – 
unlike DSR.   
Figure 6.14 shows only an example of TV-ECDH for the trust values for 
50 mobile nodes with 50% malicious mobile nodes just to show how the 
trust values of the mobile nodes vary with the tasks and their 
performance in our experiment in MANET. It is an initial Trust Values 
when the experiment starts the simulation. However, these Trust Values 
change during the simulation time.   
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Figure 6.14: Trust Values for 50 nodes (in High malicious nodes) 
 
6.8 Summary  
This chapter has explained and focused in detail trust routing in 
MANET. The concept of trust value can be part of the key management 
subsystems to implement more flexible and self organized scheme. As a 
result, the most significant contribution is that any mobile node can issue 
the certificate of authentication by evaluating the trustworthiness of 
neighbours. In this chapter, we have put forward a new trust model 
based on ECDH and has been devoted to the analysis of data from self 
created network scenario. The outcomes have been presented in figures. 
Clearly, it has been shown that TV-ECDH is outperform in detecting 
selfish mobile nodes compared to DSR and CONFIDANT protocols in 
low (10%) and high (50%) malicious mobile nodes in the network.  
Our design enables increase in performance of securing routing 
information without decrease in security through trust relationships 
which reduce unnecessary calculations. TV-ECDH model can also catch 
any kind of selfish behaviour made by any kinds of selfish or erroneous 
mobile nodes, eliminate that node from the route table, trust the route to 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
1 8 15 22 29 36 43 50 
Tr
u
st
 V
al
u
e
s 
Mobile Nodes 
TV-ECDH 
113 
 
that node or drop it from the network by adding our trust value to ECDH 
protocol which has been implemented in chapter 4 to increase the 
security in MANET by eliminating them from the routes between the 
mobile nodes.   
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
7.1 Conclusion   
As mobile technologies become more and more important, security also 
becomes a major issue. As technologies develop and improve, so do the 
types of attacks. As shown in the previous chapters, attacks can be 
varied and sophisticated and can have disastrous consequences. It is 
essential to have security measures that can detect and prevent such 
attacks. 
Security routing protocol in (MANET) has become one of the main 
challenges faced by researchers. Indeed, It is hard to implement security 
routing protocols in MANETs because of the absence of infrastructure, 
the limitation of resources (such as power, bandwidth) and the dynamic 
topology changing.   
The variable and diverse nature of attacks also makes it challenging for 
researchers to devise routing protocols. Indeed, as explained in the 
earlier chapters, attacks facing the routing protocol can range from 
active to passive attacks. In passive attacks, the attacker listens to the 
channel and packets without disturbing the operations of the network. 
However, in active attacks, the attacker disturbs the operations of the 
network by modifications, fabrications or alterations. Security routing 
protocols, therefore, have to be devised to deal with a range of attacks.  
In this thesis, we present two solutions to secure the routing protocols in 
DSR: Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) and Trust Routine based 
on DSR protocol. Our proposed solutions of the key exchange Elliptic 
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) work well with DSR routing protocol. 
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Many secure routing protocols, such as Ariadne, has a very complicated 
key exchange. These cause a lack of power and bandwidth.  
Our contribution is a) to provide trustworthy communications among the 
mobile nodes in the network, b) to encourage untrustworthy mobile 
nodes to be trustable, and c) to discourage untrustworthy mobile nodes 
from participating in the network to gain services. 
Our implementation of the ECDH key exchange, as described in earlier 
chapters, offers three major advantages compared to other secure routing 
protocols: (a) it is significantly faster, (b) it has small key size, (c) it is 
more energy efficient, that is, it consumes less energy than the other 
secure routing protocols. This is an attractive solution as an attacker 
might capture the public keys PA and PB, but the attacker cannot be able 
to conclude the private key nA and nB from PA and PB.  
We have also proposed the solution for the Trust routing based on DSR 
protocol. This design also works in a very efficient manner: it increases 
the security routing performance through trust relationship that reduce 
the calculations. Some trust models present their trust relationship based 
on credit history from previous networks such TARP routing protocol. 
This may affect the trust evaluation. Putting it all together, our results 
confirm the high performance which has been achieved and simulated on 
NS2 simulator. 
Our proposed solutions have been simulated and evaluated therefore, 
fare better than the existing secure routing protocols which have been 
compared in the previous chapters. We have put forward two proposals 
that not only detect attacks but also protect networks. Our solutions also 
take efficiency into account: they are fast using small key and save 
energy consumption.  
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7.2 Future Work 
In the coming years, progress in mobile technologies will happen at a 
very fast rate. Security measures will have to match the pace of progress 
in the field. It is very likely that the types and nature of attacks will also 
develop quickly. There will also be a need for new security routing 
protocols, 
Our scheme, through the proposal is specialized in three most important 
fast, small key size and energy-efficient solutions, seeks to contribute to 
the area of security in mobile networks. However, further work is 
needed in the field. Future designs have to be even more efficient. The 
steps below have to be followed to ensure a good secure routing protocol 
design:  
(1) Implement a group of attacks against ECDH and Trust model;  
(2) calculate the power consumption for ECDH;  
(3) Improve and extend our proposed design such as End-to-End Quality 
of Service (QoS) and power efficient protocol provisions;  
(4) Explore other areas in Mobile Ad Hoc Network such as MAC layer 
and;  
(5) Explore other areas in wireless networking, such as MAC layer 
issues and location. 
The constant update and improvement of secure routing protocols should 
ensure that networks are always protected against malicious attacks and 
can also face the challenge of new attacks. There will, therefore, always 
be a need for more research and improvement in security measures in 
wireless networks. 
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